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논문검색

Seller Investment Incentive on Heterogeneous Platforms Under Competition

초록

영어

This paper sets an analytical model to study the scenario that two differentiated sellers simultaneously trade on two competitive heterogeneous platforms—for-profit platform and open platform. Three research questions are discussed: (1) If sellers trade on both competitive heterogeneous platforms, how should he/she price on the different platforms and what are the impact factors? (2) How do the fees charged by for-profit platforms to sellers and consumers affect sellers’ pricing and consumers’ selection on platforms? (3) What is the difference of seller’s investment incentives between for-profit platforms and open platforms? This paper finds that if the total fees charged by for-profit platforms keep constant, the split-up between the fees to sellers and consumers will not affect consumers’ selection of platforms. Both the fees charged by the for-profit platform and consumers distribution between platforms will affect sellers’ decision on pricing and investment on heterogeneous platforms.

목차

Abstract
 1. Introduction
 2. Model Set-up
  2.1. Framework
  2.2. Timing
 3. Model Analyses
  3.1. Consumers’ Decision
  3.2 Sellers’ Pricing Decision
  3.3. Sellers’ Investment Incentive on Heterogeneous Platforms
 4. Conclusions
 Acknowledgements
 References

저자정보

  • Xuan Jiang Huazhong University of Science and Technology Wuhan, 430074, China
  • Shiming Deng Huazhong University of Science and Technology Wuhan, 430074, China

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