원문정보
초록
영어
Government departments can effectively utilize information resources and improve public service quality and administrative capacity when involve in e-Government information sharing, but there are additional costs of the information sharing. Employing a Bayesian game model with white noise, the decision-making of government departments to involve in e-Government information sharing under the condition of e-Government coordination and incomplete information is analyzed. A unique equilibrium obtained through this model describes that when all government departments make decisions under rational principles (instead of random principles), part of them decide to involve in e-Government information sharing, while the others decide not. This equilibrium is more close to the reality. According to the parametric analysis, the proportion of government departments in e-Government information sharing is affected by the division level of government departments functions, the expected benefits of information sharing, the degree of interdependence of government departments and the differences of government departments. The good results are got form the instance.
목차
1. Introduction
2. Background
3. Complete Information Static Game Model
3.1. The Game with Two Government Departments
3.2. The Game with n Government Departments
4. The Static Game with Incomplete Information and the Equilibrium
4.1. Introduction of the Incomplete Information
4.2. The Bayesian Game Model
4.3. The Equilibrium
4.4. Parametric Analysis
5. Instance
6. Conclusions
Acknowledgements
References