earticle

영어

Recently, Korea’s Ministry of Justice has announced that it will amend Article 415 bis 2 of the Commercial Code to strengthen the supervisory function of the board of directors. There has been a sort of self-contradiction under the current system[esp. in a company which has the audit committee] in which the function of management and supervision is all concentrated onto the board of directors. To head off this inconsistency the draft revised bill would compel a company which has audit committee to introduce executive officer system and under the system, the executive officer is banned from serving as chairman of the board. Legislative intent enunciated by the department is recovery of the principle of checks and balances and enhancement of transparency in the arena of corporate governance. But the business community has expressed its concern in a high tone that enforcing uniformed executive officer system could cause several side effects and a lot of confusions[especially to those listed companies which have assets more than 2 trillion won, forcing the system is considered as causing unnecessary trouble while no other countries do so]. According to the business circle, if the system will be enforced, Korean-style speed-based management will no longer be applicable. Further, they say that the system will encroach upon the companies’ autonomy seriously and be incompatible with the spirit of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea in respect of breaking the balance of legal interests. When South Korea revised its commercial code in 1999, it tried to have greater transparency in corporate governance by introducing outside director and audit committee system. However, it didn't adopt executive officer system based upon the perception that company's ultimate goal lie in pursuing profit, not in enhancing transparency. In case of listed company, many numbers of directors were replaced by outside directors, when outside director system was compelled by law. However, non-registrated officers practically managed company even though they are just commercial employees or delegated people[it is perceived irrational and inefficient to have board of directors manage the company, since outside directors who are the majority of the board are not well-versed in the internal affairs of company]. Under the circumstances in which these non-registered officers are able to participate in crucial part of management but free from responsibilities, the introduction of executive officer system in 2011 was accepted not only necessary but also desirable. But there was also criticism in the perspective of effectiveness because company can decide whether to have executive officer, and even in case where company introduced executive officer, it is free to have non-registrated officer as well. For these reasons, the draft revised bill of commercial code has enforced implementation of executive officer only to company which has audit committee. But it is high time that we should reconsider it. Think of RMBCA's case. It previously enforced certain kinds of officers, but as of now it is totally changed. Whether or not to have an executive officer is an option, and it does not specify any kinds of officers allowed to have. It is somewhat hard to generalize the relationship between company and executive officer, since the relationship can widely vary by articles of association or contract. In managing the company,professionalism should be emphasized more than anything. There are small companies that have agent cost like venture companies because ownership and management is well-separated, but there are also larger companies which have smaller agent cost because they have their own controlling shareholders. Even though executive officer system itself has several merits to be lauded both in theory and practice, it also has defects which can not be easily undone. More than anything else, executive officer system can retard decision making process in a company. If we only focus on transparency, efficiency and maximization of interests of shareholders, which are two most important pillars in the development of economy based on the company system, can be ruined.

한국어

어떤 기업지배구조를 선택할 것인지의 문제는 기업뿐만 아니라 국가의 운명을 가를 수 있는대단히 중요한 문제인 데, 효율성 측면에서나 미국과 영국의 경제가 유럽대륙이나 아시아 경제보다 훨씬 경쟁력이 있다는 점에 있어서 나 앵글로-아메리칸 모델이 가장 우수하다고 주장하는 자들이 많다. 그러나 회사의 지배구조는 해당 회사가 속한 경제체제에서 효율적으로 기능할 수 있는초기적 제반 조건에 맞아야 하는 것이고, 급진적 변혁에는 저항이 따른 다고 하는 경로의존성 이론이나 그 중간적 입장에도 설득력이 있다고 본다. 그리고 자본주의 사회에서, 회사법의 역할은회사법의 개입을 정당화할 수 있을 정도의 공익(public good)적 측면이 강한 것을 제외하고는 될수 있는 한 , 기업의 자율에 맡기는 것이 옳을 것이며, 획일화된 구조와 혁신이 서로 어울리지 않음은 역사가 증명하고 있다. 설령 앵글로-아메리칸 모델이 국제적인 일반기준으로 최적이라 하더라도 하나의 정형적인 지배구조 형태만으로 는 시장, 제도, 경영, 사회 환경 등에 있어서 기업의고유한 특성과 다양성을 필요․충분적으로 충족시키기는 어렵다 고 보아야 할 것이다. 무엇보다도 기업지배구조 문제에 대한 정답은 존재하지 않는다. 결국 소유와 경영이 분리되어 공적인 요소가 강한 회사에 한해 감사위원회제도 및 사외이사그리고 집행임원제를 의무적으로 도입하는 거시적인 방안이 모색되어야 하며, 그 방법에 대해서는 많은 연구가 축적된 후에 다시 검토 하는 것이 바람직할 것으로 본다. 또한 집행임원제도를최초로 도입한 미국의 경우에는 기업실무상 이사회가 회사 업무를 모두 처리할 수 없다는 현실적필요에 의해서 생겨난 관행을 수용한 것으로, 이사들이 회사의 일상적인 업 무에 능동적으로 대처할 수 있는 시간이 없다는 점에서 연유하였다. 당초에 감독기능과 업무집행 기능의 분리를 염두에 두고 만들어진 것이 아니라는 것이다. 미국과 일본이 집행임원이 이사와 이사회의장을 겸할수 있도록 한 것도 바로 그러한 이유에서이다. 그렇다면 집행임원의 겸직문제도 기업의 자율에 맡기는 것이 옳을 것이며, CEO 지배 문제는 주주권한의 확대를 통해서 해소할 수 있고, 지배구조문제의 해결 또한 주주권한 확대를 통한 것이 가 장 효율적이므로 집행임원제의 의무화보다 시급한 것은 이사회의 정보수집 능력을 향상시키려는 입법적 노력이 다.