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Income Inequality and Democratization

원문정보

Dae-Jin Yi, Jun-Hee Woo

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초록

영어

Why are some countries democratic, and others not? What makes democratic political regimes rise? The main goal of this paper is to use game theoretical models and empirical findings to demonstrate the relationship between income inequality and democratization. This paper shows that a democratic transition becomes feasible when the inequality of conditions among individuals exists in the point that an authoritarian strategy to avoid redistribution under a democratic rule is not attractive to the wealthy any more. Also, this paper tests the hypotheses about the effects of income inequality on democratization with unbalanced pooled time-series cross-sectional data that cover 49 countries for 1970-2000. Empirical findings indicate that high levels of economic inequality are related to democratic governments more than authoritarian regimes.

목차

Abstract
 Introduction
 Income Inequality and Democratization
 Game-Theoretical Model
  Preferences and Payoffs
  The Game
  Equilibria
 The Empirical Evidence
  Data and Model Specification
  Democratization
  Inequality
  Control Variables
  Findings
 Conclusion
 References

저자정보

  • Dae-Jin Yi Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Korea
  • Jun-Hee Woo Korea University, Korea

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자료제공 : 네이버학술정보

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