earticle

영어

The history of phenomenology begins with Husserl. Husserl insists that "concept of intentionality" is indispensable at the start of phenomenology. In this sense, consciousness-as-intentional is the subject of phenomenology, so that intentionality is not a specific problem that can be isolated, treated, and left behind when Husserl goes on to treat other problems. There are two competing theories of intentionality: the Content Theory(CT) and the Object Theory(OT). According to OT, mental acts are to be individuated by their psychological mode and their object. According to OT, mental acts are to be individuated by their psychological mode and their content. Although in his phenomenology Husserl puts the external world into brackets, still, he does not doubt its existence. He is not, therefore, an ontological idealist, for he does not the existence of the external world. On the other hand, Husserl made a famous announcement that the dream of philosophy as rigorous science is over. Heidegger's break with Husserl provides a changing of the subject of philosophy. He rejects Husserl's phenomenological reduction. According to Richard Rorty, the break that took place between Husserl and Heidegger is a specific illustration of the change by which philosophy is coming to its end. The obvious break in the history of phenomenology occurs, however, in Sartre's and Merleau-Ponty's interprertatations of Husserl. Sartre intrudes a distinction of level between philosophy as abstract and literature as concrete. When we finally reach Derrida, these discontinuities are all discounted. One route Derrida takes in arriving at his own end-of-philosophy perspective is by a deconstruction of Husserl.