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논문검색

A Supervision Contract Design of Electronic Products Manufacturers Controlling E-waste Pollution at Source under the Government and Consumers Supervising

초록

영어

The issue of government supervision to electronic products manufacturers was researched by principal-agent theory. Considered the potential gains of electronic products manufacturers affected by the consumers strengthening environmental protection consciousness, introduced the supervision cost and penalty, constructed the optimal incentive contract, and used these to establish a model which can maximize the expected revenue from governments. By analyzing the potential benefits from electronic products manufacturers and the validity of supervision mechanism from the governments department, the conclusion is found that the preference of green consumption can be the driving force for the manufacturers taking part in the activity of electronic wastes pollution control, so the roles for governments in electronic waste source pollution control is that impel and supervise the electronic products manufacturers, and the more measure is to inspire customers putting into effect green consumption, but the special attention should be paid to is that governments should designs appropriate punishment for electronic products manufacturers so that avoids ratcheting effect.

목차

Abstract
 1. Introduction
 2. The Model
  2.1. The Basic Model Assumptions
  2.2. Governments’ Expected Revenue Maximization Model
 3. The Solution and Discussion
  3.1. Under the Condition that p = 0, y = 0
  3.2. Under the Condition that p = 0, y ≠ 0 
  3.3. Under the Condition that p ≠ 0, y ≠ 0 
 4. Analysis
 5. Numerical Analysis
 6. Conclusions
 Acknowledgements
 References

저자정보

  • Mingming Ren Business School of Henan Normal University, Xinxiang,
  • Cong Liu Business School of Henan Normal University, Xinxiang

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