earticle

영어

This paper attempts to analyze efficiency of the housing redevelopment market from the standpoint of property rights theory, a branch of the various New Institutional Economics disciplines. Recognizing the shortcomings of the Pareto-efficiency criterion in the theoretical as well as practical sense, the property rights approach concentrates on examining the transactions and the relevant transaction cost implications that occur in the housing redevelopment market, together with the incentive structures that are provided by various institutions that define and enforce property rights in the market. The findings show that because property rights are not clearly defined and distributed among the stakeholders and market participants, there exist various transaction costs which, in turn, cause substantial inefficiency in the process of housing redevelopment. Furthermore, the inefficiency is asymmetrically distributed among the market participants, with being disproportionately biased toward the less empowered households and tenants. To improve efficiency in the allocation of resources, property rights should be defined in a more sound fashion reflecting faithfully the existing property rights, and if possible, the bundle of property rights should be separated, with each being transferable among the market participants. In addition, suppressing the rent-seeking behaviors on the part of the influential participants in the markets would improve efficiency in the property development market.