원문정보
Executives of State‐owned Enterprises Bound by the Legal Mechanism of Supervision in China — To the Responsibility System Based on Trust —
중국국유기업고관감독약속법률궤제탐석 — 이신탁책임제도위기출 —
초록
영어
Frequency contributes the state‐owned enterprise high salary, the state‐owned shareholder representative restrains adynamia the salary payment committee is titular, the marketplace has no way to give state‐owned enterprise height to be in charge of correct fixed price, "three have no " a high salary so, refraction futility being that owner anxiously expecting in become market oriented course Chinese lacks for a place , property right reforms exactly , system vacancy become estranged overseeing vacancy place , must work out the rational border urgently.
Make the trust responsibility that state‐owned enterprise height is in charge of clear, urge the person to fulfill trust duty ,structure trust responsibility investigating mechanism public good legal action , strengthen the information disclosure duty that height is in charge of to state‐owned shareholder representative. Found science , the high‐effect state‐owned enterprise thereby highly superintending the mechanism restraining a law driving a state‐owned enterprises reform with regard to, governing perfecting our country state‐owned enterprise is machine‐made, being in motion and doing business raising state‐owned enterprise efficiency, the added value realizing state‐owned assets keeps value having very important significance.
목차
1. 国资委的监督约束存在缺位、越位
2. 高管约束的制度供给不足与滞后
3. 产权改革约束的偏向
Ⅱ. 中国国有企业高管监督约束与信托责任制度的引入
Ⅲ. 国有企业高管信托责任制度的构建
1. 明确国有企业高管的信托责任,促使其履行信托义务
2. 公益诉讼:信托责任追究机制
3. 强化国企高管对国有股东代表的信息披露义务
参考书目