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미국의 통상정책과 근로자권리 - 개발도상국을 중심으로

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US Trade Policy and Labor Rights

김희성

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There have been attempts to link trade and labour standards since the late 19th century - in Charnovitz's word, a 'long story of false start, hollow promises and forgotten laws. three broad objectives have been pursued. The first is to encourage labour standards in the exporting country that are comparable with those in the those in the importing country, that is harmonisation or a level playing-field, to prevent 'unfair' competition. The used are characteristically the imposition of anti-dumping or countervailing duties. The best-known example is the US Tariff Acts of 1922 and 1930 under which the President was empowered to adjust tariffis to equalise the differences in the cost of production between a domestic article and a similar foreign article. This applied to all factors of production, but waw aimed particularly at products of cheap labour in foreign countries, Similar measures were adopted before the Second World War by several countries including Argentina, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Cuba, Spain and the United Kingdom. These provision were popular ing the 1930s, but have generally fallen into disuse as 'cost equalisation' arguments have been discredited.
A second objective has been to ensure compliance with common international lbour standard, to which exporting nations must adhere. The means have included the 'stick' of quantitative restriction on imports(negative conditionality), as well as the 'carrot' of preference trade benefits(positive conditionality). The international standards to which such measures apply have developed over time starting with the trade in slaves, followed by bans on the importation of the products of prison labour, forced labour and child labour. Other standards sometimes enforced in this way include occupational safety and health (starting with the famous Berne Treaty of 1906 between 14 nations to prohibit the importation of matches containing white phosphorous), minimum wages and maximum hours of work. These subjects are today included in the concept of 'internationally recognised worker rights' utilised in Us trade legislation. A more widely utilised definition is that of 'core labour standards' corresponding to the four heads of the ILO 1998 Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. These are regarded as essential human rights that should be protected through trade sanctions.
A third objective is to ensure the enforcement of domestic labour laws on defined subjects by the exporting country. Unlike the second objective, this recognises the sovereignty of each country to set its own labour laws, but holds them accountable to ensure compliance with certain basic principles. The most important example is the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC) which contains 11 labour principles including but going beyond the ILO's 'core'. Under NAALC, fines can be levied on countries that persistently fail to enforce domestic laws relating to child labour, minimum wages and occupational health and safety. There are variation on this in other US trade agreements.
Some of these objectives may be pursued unilaterally, that is by the action of a state or trading block without the agreement of the targeted state. The US is th major practitioner of unilateralism, particularly through its Generalised System of Preferences (GSP).
Both the US and EU GSPs may be described as unilateral because they do not rest on agreement with the targeted countries. However, the EU system may be described as ‘soft’ unilateralism because it avoids most of the criticisms which have been directed at ‘aggressive’ US unilateralism. First,the EU does not under­mine the rule of international law. It applies the ILO 8 core conventions,which all EU Member States have ratified,unlike the US which has ratified only two of these. Compliance with the core standards is a condition of membership of the ILO,even by those countries that have not ratified the core conventions. Unlike the US,the EU does not require compliance with any other unratified conventions. In the EU,unlike the US,a clear link has been established with the various supervisory bodies of the ILO. These are ‘the point of departure’ for EU action.
Secondly,unlike the US, the EU has to follow transparent and fair procedures before withdrawing or refusing preferences. The European Commission does not have the same ambiguous discretions as the USTR,for example there is no equivalent in the EU to the US criterion of whether a country is ‘taking steps’ to afford worker rights. In the absence of a full-scale study,it is still too early to say whether the EU procedures have been fully effective,but it is clear that the carrot of preferences has induced countries to ensure that they have,at least,ratified the core conventions.
Thirdly,it is far harder to sustain the charge of protectionism against the EU GSP than it is against US trade measures. These preferences are a legacy of the historical relationship with former European colonies and are now part of a larger framework for the integration of developing countries. They appear to fall within the WTO’s ‘enabling clause' which allows the grant of non­reciprocal trade benefits provided that these benefit all developing countries without discrimination (chapter 6, below). There is no equivalent in the EU to the labour rights amendment to section 301 of the US Trade Act that permits mandatory retaliatory sanctions,and there is no evidence of preferences being granted or denied by the EU for protectionist or political purposes. This indicates that it is possible to maintain a policy of linking trade preferences with core labour standards. The US is unlikely to modify its approach to one that is more development-friendly without a push from the WTO and also from the developing countries.

목차

Ⅰ. 서설
 Ⅱ. 무역과 근로기준의 연계: 3가지 유형
 Ⅲ. 미국의 통상 정책과 근로자권리
  1. 공격적 일방주의(Aggressive unilateralism)
  2. 공격적 일방주의(미국의 통상정책)에 관한 비판
 Ⅳ. 완화된 일방주의 : EU의 일반 관세특혜 제도(Soft unilateralism : EU's generalised system of preference)
  1. 제4차 Lomé 조약과 쌍방주의
  2. EU 일반관세특혜제도: 채찍과 당근
 Ⅴ. 결론
 참고문헌
 

저자정보

  • 김희성 Kim, Hee-Sung. 강원대학교 법학전문대학원 교수

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