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이 논문은 공무수행 맥락 속에 공무원의 전략적 설정을 가정하고 적극행정 대비 소극행정 행태의 우위 현상을 설명한다. 합리적 선택 중심의 신제도주의와 설정 개념 논리에 기초한 죄수딜레마 게임틀을 연구모형으로 구성하여 상급자와 하급직원의 전략적 효용 인식을 실증한다. 먼저 공무원의 적극/소극행정에 대한 전략적 설정을 논리적으로 설명한 후, 3차례의 설문조사결과를 토대로 게임 효용값을 추정한다. 제한된 합리성을 갖는 현실 공무원들은 법치행정과 재량권 제약을 특징으로 하는 관료제도와 위계･경쟁･집단 문화정향성이 혼합된 공무수행 맥락에서 소극행정을 전략적 우위로 설정함을 확인한다. 마지막으로, 연구결과에 따른 실천적･이론적 함의를 제시한다.
This paper attempts to explain the ‘Sokeug’ (Passive) administration as the dominant strategy of Korean public officials over the ‘Jugkeug’ (Active) administration in enacting the context of public serving. Based on the rational choice-centered institutionalism and the concept of enactment, a prisoner's dilemma game is framed for research model, and then the strategic utility perception of superior and subordinate officials is demonstrated. First, this paper presents a logical game framework for public servants on the strategic dominance of passive administration. Second, this paper estimates the utility values of the game from the results of three surveys. Third, this paper argues that Korean public officials with bounded rationality enact passive administration as a strategic advantage under the public service context which is combined a bureaucratic system characterized by the rule of law and limited discretion with an organization culture characterized by hierarchical and competitive group orientation. Finally, this study offers theoretical implications for linking institutional with cultural studies, as well as practical suggestions for changing the public service context and promoting active administration.
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Active ‒ Passive administration, Organizational culture, Bureaucracy
