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회계는 경제적 거래나 현상의 법적 외형이 경제적 실질과 상이한 경우 경제적 실질에 따라 회계처리토록 하는 경제적 실질 우선 원칙을 기본으로 한다. 특히, 원칙중심의 국제회계기준은 경영자의 재량적 판단이 개입될 여지가 증가함에 따라 이러한 경제적 실질 우선 원칙의 중요성이 더욱 강조된다. 이에 본 연구는 건설 분야에 일반화되어 있는 프로젝트 파이낸싱 개발사업의 경제적 실질을 분석하고, 관련 회계이슈에 대해 논의한다. 프로젝트 파이낸싱 사업의 경우 법적으로는 사업주체인 시행사와 시공업무를 담당하는 건설사(시공사)의 역할이 명확하게 구분된다. 그러나 현실에서는 지급보증 등 다양한 실무적 고려사항으로 인해 양 자의 경계가 모호한 경우가 빈번하며, 그 결과 경제적 실질에 대한 충분한 고려 없이 도급계약이라는 법적 외형에 따른 회계처리를 수행하는 건설사가 아직까지 존재하는 것으로 파악된다. 금융감독당국의 A건설사 감리지적사례에서도 건설사가 시행사와 체결한 도급계약이라는 법적 외형을 근거로 도급공사로 회계처리했으나, 본 연구는 시행사와 건설사 간의 특수관계, 건설사 중심의 사업진행 과정 등 여러 상황과 사실관계에 비추어 동 사업의 경제적 실질이 자체공사에 가까움을 보인다. 또한 이와 관련하여 추가 검토되어야 할 주요 회계이슈로 건설사의 시행사 연결 여부, 우발부채와 특수관계자 공시 필요성, 공사대금에 대한 손상차손 인식 여부 등을 제시한다. 끝으로 업계 전문가와의 면담내용을 기초로 건설사가 설립·운영하는 시행사의 주요 특성(예. 건설사의 시행사에 대한 높은 수준의 통제, 건설사와 시행사 간 특수관계 및 배타적 도급계약 체결 등)을 소개한다. 본 연구는 건설업 특성과 회계처리를 이해하고자 하는 학습자를 위한 교육자료와 건설업 종사자와 외부감사인을 위한 실무지침으로서 기능하고, 나아가 건설업계의 올바른 회계처리를 위한 정책적 시사점을 제공할 것으로 기대된다.


Substance-over-form principle is one of the key foundations in accounting which mandates firms to follow economic substance of transactions rather than legal form of those transactions when the two are inconsistent. Under the principle-based IFRS system where managerial discretion is widely allowed, the importance of substance-over-form principle is more emphasized. In this study, we analyze the economic substance of project financing-based development business and discusses related accounting issues, a model which becomes prevalent in the Korean construction industry. In a project financing business, developers and construction firms are distinct in their roles and responsibilities from a legal perspective; the role and responsibility of the former are broad in relation with overall business operation (e.g., designing a development project at the initial stage, financing, purchasing land for development, proceeding administrative procedures, contracting with a construction firm, and selling), while those of the latter are restricted only to construction. In reality, however, such distinction is often blurred due to various considerations (e.g., payment guarantee of construction firms against developers’ default cases). As a result, some construction firms are suspected to report their financial information simply based on a construction contract (i.e., legal form) without economic substance of the contract properly considered. Using an audit review case on construction firm A, we show it is likely that despite a construction contract (i.e., legal form) with a developer, the construction firm had actively managed the entire development project from an economic perspective (just as its own development project). Our argument is primarily based on the fact that the construction firm and the developer are in special relation (i.e., related parties) despite no explicit ownership between the two entities. Further, the construction firm provides payment guarantee against the developer’s potential default cases and is closely involved in various key decision-makings of the project. As such, if a developer is legally independent but under the de facto control of a construction firm, it is important to carefully review the following accounting issues. First of all, a construction firm should consider consolidating a developer in financial reporting. A construction firm needs to incorporate all circumstances and facts beyond a simple equity relationship in deciding whether to possess controlling power over a developer. Second, two disclosure issues may follow when a developer is not consolidated as a result of the first consideration. Since a construction firm generally provides credit enhancing services to a developer (e.g., payment guarantee) in a project financing-based business model, contingent liabilities may be required to be recognized. In addition, if those in a keen relation with the owner of a construction firm (e.g., relatives, executives, and employees) work for a developer, they may fall under related parties by the relevant accounting standards. Hence, contingent liabilities, related party transactions, or both, if any, should be properly disclosed in the footnote. Third, another consideration, when a developer is not consolidated, is impairment that can occur as a developer’ business risk is passed on to a construction firm. The direct subject bearing such business risk is a developer who manages overall business operation, but if the project goes unsuccessful, receivables of a construction firm may not be fully collectable. Therefore, when evaluating receivables, the probability of a developer’s default needs to be taken into account so that construction firm’s profits and equity are not overstated. Finally, from interviews with industry experts, this study illustrates distinct characteristics of a developer run by a construction firm which are summarized as follows: i) special relationship between a developer and a construction firm, ii) construction firm’s strong control over a developer (e.g., keeping a developer’s corporate seal within a construction firm), iii) direct cash management and payment by a construction firm during a project, iv) compensation for a developer’s executives and employees by a construction firm, v) active management of a project by a construction firm, vi) construction firm’s (implicit) permission for a concurrent job position at a developer, vii) exclusive contracting with a developer and a construction firm, viii) (almost) no physical entity of a developer, and ix) selective ownership transfer of successful projects from a developer to a construction firm. This study expectedly functions not only as educational material for learners but practical guidance on accounting treatments (auditing) for construction firms (auditors) and provides useful policy implications for regulators to improve accounting practices in the construction industry.