Construction of Large Dams Under the Japanese Rule in Korea and “Development Disaster”: A Case Study of Nitchitsu’s Construction of Bujeongang Hydroelectric Power Plant

As a key industry, electric power industries characteristically involve large engineering works, which irreversibly change the community and environment of the development area. This article traced Nitchitsu’s building of Bujeongang Hydroelectric Power Plant and its concomitant change in the development area. It was the first-ever construction project promoted in Korea for a large dam. It was notable how, after the construction of the dam, every conceivable disaster increased in the development area. This was due to the radical environmental changes. It was concluded that “development itself was a disaster” in the local society of colonial Korea, where political, legal, and social regulations regarding development were poor. This study expounded three significant points. First, Nitchitsu adopted the latest construction technology called the watershed change method and large-dam structure when they built the Bujeongang Hydroelectric Power Plant. After development, however, disasters occurred frequently in the area due to the change of fluvial landform. It was because the Government–General exempted Nitchitsu from a water tax, which was imposed on river maintenance construction. It was exempted because they were unable to finance the damage prevention. Nitchitsu hurriedly drove construction without measuring the quantity of flow properly. After completion, conflicts about securing the lacking quantity occurred time and again. Furthermore, Hamheung Irrigation Association was constructed downriver to use Nitchitsu’s effluents. Due to the construction of the power plant, the overflow reached the plain area downstream serially, spreading damage. Second, after construction of the power plant, disasters from environmental change increased sharply in the area. In spring, as water dried up due to drought, the company put restrictions on drain capacity to secure pondage for generation of electric power. This repeated the damage to a rice field that dried up annually during the rice planting season in the area of the Irrigation Association. Floods in summertime and freezing temperatures in winter caused collapse and breakage at the plant facilities. Therefore, the resultant damage of overflow, water leakage, and gush occurred frequently. There were successive disasters caused directly by the operational plant. There were, for example, the collapse of the village’s embankment after gathering gravel for construction work, or surprise closure of sluices to protect facilities of the plant. Third, Nitchitsu had already experienced damage in Japan with plant construction, advance preparation, post-factum provision of measures, and compensation, but did not execute these in colonial Korea, enlarging the damage. This was the result of a corporate strategy that capitalized from a sociopolitical difference between Japan and colonial Korea. It was the result of the choice made by a colonial administrative organ that sacrificed “residents” for the convenience of “the company”. In summary, for the locals, development did not mean a level road to “modernization” or “richness”; for them, it brought about a history of disaster where they had to suffer menace in their subsistence and living for the profit of the enterprise.