초록 열기/닫기 버튼

Although a series of judicial precedents related to employees under the Labor Union Act argue that the scope of employee status under the Labor Union Act is broader than that of under the Labor Standards Act, there is irrationality and irony in the fact that, among all types of employed workers, only golf caddies have been recognized as employees in a broader scope than that of under the Labor Standards Act. Also, there have been criticisms that precedents have not presented specific and reasonable criteria for determining employee status under the Labor Union Act. Using the recent home-study teacher ruling as a precedent and referring to the Japanese theory of interpretation, this study aims to specify the criteria and methods for determining employee status under the Labor Union Act, and thereby clarify the difference between the Labor Standards Act (a relationship of human subordinacy) and Labor Union Act (a relationship of economic and organizational subordinacy). It is worth affirmatively noting that this ruling paved the way for employed persons who were previously not recognized as employees under the Labor Standards Act (workers in special employment types) to be recognized as employees under the Labor Union Act, and therefore to be guaranteed the three fundamental labor rights. However, questions remain as to why legal principles waver according to labor union types and employment status, despite the fact that there is only one legal provision related to employees under the Labor Union Act (Article 1, Clause 2 of Labor Union Act). This leads to a clearly ironic situation in which, in case of super-industrial labor unions, the employee status of unemployed persons and job seekers becomes stronger than that of employed persons. This may be the result of taking into account the reality in South Korea that once employee status is recognized under the Labor Union Act, the worker is immediately guaranteed all three fundamental labor rights, and therefore counterparties must be assumed during collective bargaining, bargaining agreements, and labor disputes. In the future, this issue must be supplemented with legislative and interpretative solutions. The National Labor Relations Commission must re-issue its disposition in accordance with the aim of the judgment made by the Supreme Court. In this case, it was appropriate for unfair labor practices to be acknowledged in theory following the proposal of a new legal principle, but a problem remained: how to determine the scope of remedial orders for unfair labor practices, in light of unusually severe economic disadvantages caused during eight long years which transpired until the case closed at the court level, and a period of over eight years which elapsed until the National Labor Relations Commission re-issued a disposal. It is not easy to decide whether remedial orders should stop at acknowledging unfair labor practices (and posting notices, etc.), or an order of reinstatement to original positions, or further, an order for compensation of wages over the period of disadvantaged treatment. When the establishment of unfair labor practices is recognized, there is no special legal regulation regarding what kind of remedy the labor commission should issue. Since the remedial order is left at the broad discretion of the labor commission, the commission can order appropriate and specific measures deemed necessary to correct unfair labor customs, guarantee the three fundamental labor rights, and stabilize labor-management relations. From this perspective, the practical remedial benefits of the mere acknowledgement of unfair labor practices may not be significant. Hence, a question may be raised as to whether the objective of policies for unfair labor practices, intended to protect the three fundamental labor rights, can be sufficiently achieved. Furthermore, in case an employee is reinstated, sanctions against the employer are weak in actuality, and protection for employees under the Labor Union Act may be inadequate. This may lead to criticisms that the employers may repeat unfair labor practices. The most proactive measure for the protection of the three fundamental labor rights is to compensate for economic disadvantages. However, when ordering the retroactive payment of wages, there may be criticism that the remedial method under the Labor Standards Act, premised on the concept of wages, is adopted without critical consideration, thereby causing confusion in the legal system. Conflicts of various opinions are also possible regarding the calculation method and appropriateness of the funding source of compensation, which may incite objections that rulings are merely provisional. In this case, the labor commission may utilize the “compensation order” method rather than compensation for economic disadvantages by the retroactive payment of wages. In this way, it will be able to avoid various criticisms while sufficiently contributing to the guarantee of the three fundamental labor rights.