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전속 고발제에 대한 비판은 형사 처벌의 활성화와 형사 당국의 개입이 경성 담합에 대한 억지 효과를 높여줄 것이라는 시각을 전제하고 있다. 하지만 카르텔 규제의 형사적 집행 효과는 원래 의도와는 다르게 부정적인 방향으로 나타날 수도 있으므로 좀 더 신중한 검토가 필요하다. 이 글은 먼저 카르텔에 대한 엄격한 금지는 경제적 자유주의에 기초한 시장경제체제를 위한 관점에서 정당화되는 것으로, 카르텔은 그 자체로 죄악시되는 범죄가 아니라 경제 현실과 정책 방향에 따라 판단이 달라질 수 있는 행위라는 점을 분명히 한다. 그리고 유럽 등 여러 선진국들의 사례를 살펴본 뒤 대다수 관할권들에서 카르텔 가담에 대한 형사적 처벌과 개입에 극히 신중한 모습을 보이고 있는 배경과 이유를 분석해본다. 이를 바탕으로 현재 전면개편안의 경성 카르텔 전속 고발제 폐지와 관련한 의문과 우려들을 크게 세 가지 측면에서 살펴본다. 첫째는, 우리나라 집행 주요 당사자들 간에 경성 담합 행위에 대한 반가치적 관념이 폭넓게 공유되고 있다고 볼 수 있는지 여부고, 둘째는, 전속 고발제 폐지 이후 카르텔 집행이 형사 절차화 되면서 발생할 문제점들은 없는지 여부며, 셋째는, 카르텔 규제의 형사 집행이 기존의 제도 특히 자진신고자 감면제도의 효과적 운영을 저해할 우려는 없는지 여부다. 이 글은 위와 같은 검토를 통하여 전속 고발제 폐지와 형사 당국의 개입을 통한 카르텔 규제의 형사적 집행 활성화가 정말 필요한 것인지에 대해 의문을 제기한다.
Korea’s competition authority, KFTC, has recently drafted amendments to Korea’s competition law, MRFTA, that would repeal the competition authority’s exclusive criminal referral right in respect of hardcore cartels. If being legislated into law, the criminal authority, SPO, would be authorized to investigate into price-fixing, output restriction, market division and bid-rigging cartels and bring cases to court independent of the KFTC’s referral. At the heart of such criminalization, the deterrence argument lies in and it justifies the need for joint jurisdiction by deeming cartels “criminal” to facilitate cartel deterrence and improve enforcement. However, does criminal enforcement undoubtedly ensure more effective cartel deterrence? There is limited empirical evidence to support that criminal cartel sanctions comprising custodial sentences would enhance the achievement of enforcement objectives, such as cartel detection and deterrence. Rather, it is observed that several jurisdictions, in particular in continental Europe, have not adopted criminal sanctions as a way to deter cartels and, even in jurisdictions with criminal measures, the implementation of such measures has been quite deficient. Against this backdrop, the present paper raises some questions and concerns about the criminal cartel enforcement enshrined in the amendment proposal to Korea’s competition law. The first question revolves around a lack of consensus that cartels deserve moral opprobrium, clearly. The wide and clear consensus on the immorality of cartel offence is a prerequisite for criminal enforcement because the imposition of criminal sanctions, especially imprisonment, carries a significant stigma effect. In Korea, however, it is questionable whether cartels are sufficiently reprehensible to justify such stigmatization. Although the present law already provides criminal penalties for anti-competitive cartels (subject to the KFTC’s referral), the weight of condemnation is consequential rather than retributive, and cartels appear mala prohibita rather than mala in se. Second, this paper raises a concern about the higher and stronger standard of proof for establishing violation in criminal enforcement systems that may lead to under-enforcement of cartel prohibition. The Court is likely to raise the standard of proof in administrative competition proceedings as high as that of criminal procedures if the joint jurisdiction is legislated into law. It is worth noting that the Court has already gradually elevated the evidentiary standard to prove the existence of “agreement” in competition proceedings because of the mere possibility of the criminalization of cartels. Third, this study explores some implications of criminal sanctions for individual cartel offenders to the leniency programme. Taking into account the unchecked and overarching power of Korea’s criminal authority, this paper points out that the abolishment of the KFTC’s criminal referral may undermine the effectiveness of the leniency programme by creating substantial uncertainty regarding the rewards for cartel report and cooperation, and reducing incentives for individuals to assist the prosecution. As a conclusion, the author highlights that, in order to ensure optimal or, at least, more effective cartel deterrence, further reflections need to be made regarding the institutional design of cartel enforcement framework, rather than the severeness of punishment. That is, it is worth considering, for example, ways to facilitate and stimulate private damage actions or introduce the EU’s settlement procedure into Korea’s cartel enforcement framework, rather than the criminalization of cartel enforcement.
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exclusive right of criminal referrals, cartels, hardcore cartels, agreement, deterrence, retribution, criminalization, standard of proof, leniency, competition law, 2018 amendment proposal to Korea’s competition law
