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In recent years, prominent voices in the Israeli academic and political arenas have increased their criticism of the Israeli Defense Force’s (IDF) dominant role in policy and decision-making processes in the country. The 1967 Six–Day War is perhaps the bedrock upon which IDF critics’ fears of a dominant military rest upon. They disapprove of the pressure that the military’s high command put on the government to go to war and argue that the IDF was overly dominant in determining its goals and strategic moves on the battlefield. The following analysis debunks the claims of IDF critics by presenting historical evidence that shows how political considerations overrode military calculations on the way to and during the war. It also highlights the vital contribution of the IDF’s high command to decision-making at significant crossroads. In this regard, the analysis uses organizational theory logic to question the suggestion of IDF critics to empower the National Security Council (NSC) so it could provide the government with alternative analyses and courses of action to those suggested by the IDF. Significantly, the analysis concludes that by empowering the NSC at the expense of the IDF, the government might invite confusion rather than clarity and efficiency to policy and decision-making processes, especially in times of crises and war—when quick decision and action are necessary.
