초록 열기/닫기 버튼
Restrictive preferential rules of origin (PROOs) moderate the ‘trade diversion and trade creation’ effects of free trade agreements (FTAs). Moderation effects occur because restrictive PROOs reverse the increase in the relative price of non-member country goods initially caused by FTAs. Such a reversal arises because high compliance costs associated with restrictive PROOs lead to a lower utilization of tariff preferences by member countries. With a lower utilization, the increase in the relative price of non-members country goods would be smaller than it could have been with a full utilization. Thus, restrictive PROOs will lead to less than full trade diversion from non-members to member countries, and less than complete trade creation to member countries. This paper infers the effect of restrictive PROOs on intra-regional trade from the estimated parameters of the revenue function, on the presumption that trade diversion refers to a decrease in the elasticity of substitution between import sources, and that trade creation refers to a difference between the change in import price elasticity and the trade diversion effect. Empirical results support the conjecture that restrictive PROOs move in the opposite direction of FTAs partly undoing the trade diversion and trade creation effects of FTAs.
