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The restructuring of shipping and shipbuilding companies in the midst of rapidly shrinking global shipping demand has become a prominent issue in Korea. In shipping finance, loan syndication featuring many creditors surges as the preferred option. However, increasing the numbers of creditors in the syndicate results in two opposite effects. First is the beneficial effect from their enhanced monitoring power. On the other hand, there is the adverse effect resulting from increased difficulty in coordination when syndicate members increase, particularly in bankruptcy. Our aim of this paper is to analyze the role of finance in the shipping and shipbuilder markets, and determine the theoretical optimal number of creditors for the shipping finance syndicate based on Bolton and Scharfstein (1996). The two issues above result from moral hazard and non-verifiability: coordination among many creditors for collection of bonds in case of default, and the enhancement of monitoring private benefit exploitation by the ship-owner during default. Considering the two conflicting forces result from an increase in creditor membership, we draw conclusions on determining the optimal number of creditors by considering trade-offs between these two factors: More creditors are preferred when the monitoring effect dominates. Otherwise, less creditors are preferred.
