이 글은 1950~1970년대 CIA 비밀해제 문서들에 나타나는 CIA의 독도문제 인식을 추적한 것이다. CIA는 1951년 이래 독도를 한국과 일본 간의 영토분쟁 지역이었다고 판단했으며, 한국과 일본이 역사적·지리적 영유권의 근거를 제시하고 있다고 인식했다. CIA는 1952년 이후 리앙쿠르암(Liancourt Rocks)을 독도의 공식적 지명으로 사용했다. 1950년대 CIA는 한국이 독도를 무력으로 점령하고 있으며 독도문제를 격화시키는 것이 한국정부의 책임이라는 논지를 전개하였다. ‘독도분쟁’에 대한 CIA의 전반적 평가는 1951~1954년간 지속적으로 분쟁이 고조되어 1954년 정점에 도달하였으며, 이후 분쟁은 전반적으로 현상유지적 수준에서 관리되고 있다고 평가했다. 1954년 한국의 영구시설과 경비대 배치가 완료되자, CIA는 일본이 영유권을 주장하지만 한국의 경비대가 주둔하고 있다는 현상유지적 설명으로 변경되었다. 이러한 서술 기조는 1960~70년대에도 동일하게 유지되었다. 북한은 1950년대 이승만라인(평화선)을 부정했으며, 북한과 관계정상화를 위해 일본 국회 대표단과 회동하고 공동 코뮤니케를 발표(1955. 10)했다. 1950년대 북한은 독도영유권을 주장하지는 않았으나 1974년 이후 독도문제에 개입하는 양상이 나타났다. 한국정부의 독도정책에 대해 1950년대 CIA는 한국정부가 국내 정치문제를 해결하기 위한 외부적 탈출구로 독도문제를 활용한다고 인식했다. 1960~70년대에는 한일 양국의 협력관계가 지속되면서 독도문제가 현상유지적 차원에서 관리되었기 때문에, CIA는 양국의 정책과 반응에 큰 주의를 기울이지 않았다. 1970년대 중반 이후 독도문제는 한일 양국의 문제이면서, 동시에 다양한 국제법적 쟁점들의 영향을 받기 시작했다. 또한 1970년대 이후 한국과 일본의 대륙붕 공동개발구역(제7광구)의 설정은 일정하게 한일간 독도갈등의 지연제 역할을 했을 것으로 추정된다. CIA는 한일공동개발구역을 계기로 한국·일본의 독도 공동개발 방식이나 한국의 대륙붕 양보·일본의 독도영유권 양보의 맞교환 방식을 문제해결책으로 제기하기도 했다.

This article deals with the evaluation of CIA on Dokdo Island issue based on the newly declassified CIA documents. It was in 1951 when CIA thought that Dokdo Island became a disputed island between Korea and Japan. CIA used Liancourt Rocks as an official name of Dokdo. During the 1950s, CIA thought that Korean government occupied the island by forces and the responsibility that intensified the island disputes was belonged to Korean government. According to the CIA declassified documents, the island disputes were continually escalated during 1951-54 and hit its peak in 1954 when Korean government established the permanent establishments such as lighthouse and stationed garrison onto the islands. After the year 1954, CIA evaluated that the island issue was settled down superficially. CIA evaluated the island issue was under the status of quo and this evaluation was continued during 1960-70s. The North Korea denied the legitimacy of Rhee line in 1950s and released a joint communique with Japanese Diet delegates for normalization of North Korea and Japan relation in October 1955. North Korea never argued her claims on Dokdo in 1950s, but interfered with Dokdo issue after 1974. CIA recognized that Korea government used Dokdo issue as an escapeway for the internal political difficulties in 1950s. In 1960-70s, CIA did not pay attention to Korea-Japan governments’ policy and react to the island problem because the Korea-Japan cooperation and continued good mood made the Dokdo issue as a status quo. In the middle of 1970s, various international aspects such as the UN Law of Sea influenced the Dokdo island issue. Also the Joint Development Zone of continental shelf between Korea and Japan influenced the calm down of Dokdo dispute. CIA proposed the solutions such as Korea-Japan joint development of Dokdo Island and Korea would have the Dokdo island on fair terms that Japan have more claims on continental shelf.

This article deals with the evaluation of CIA on Dokdo Island issue based on the newly declassified CIA documents. It was in 1951 when CIA thought that Dokdo Island became a disputed island between Korea and Japan. CIA used Liancourt Rocks as an official name of Dokdo. During the 1950s, CIA thought that Korean government occupied the island by forces and the responsibility that intensified the island disputes was belonged to Korean government. According to the CIA declassified documents, the island disputes were continually escalated during 1951-54 and hit its peak in 1954 when Korean government established the permanent establishments such as lighthouse and stationed garrison onto the islands. After the year 1954, CIA evaluated that the island issue was settled down superficially. CIA evaluated the island issue was under the status of quo and this evaluation was continued during 1960-70s. The North Korea denied the legitimacy of Rhee line in 1950s and released a joint communique with Japanese Diet delegates for normalization of North Korea and Japan relation in October 1955. North Korea never argued her claims on Dokdo in 1950s, but interfered with Dokdo issue after 1974. CIA recognized that Korea government used Dokdo issue as an escapeway for the internal political difficulties in 1950s. In 1960-70s, CIA did not pay attention to Korea-Japan governments’ policy and react to the island problem because the Korea-Japan cooperation and continued good mood made the Dokdo issue as a status quo. In the middle of 1970s, various international aspects such as the UN Law of Sea influenced the Dokdo island issue. Also the Joint Development Zone of continental shelf between Korea and Japan influenced the calm down of Dokdo dispute. CIA proposed the solutions such as Korea-Japan joint development of Dokdo Island and Korea would have the Dokdo island on fair terms that Japan have more claims on continental shelf.

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Central Intelligence Agency, CREST, Dokdo, Liancourt Rocks, Takeshima, Rhee Line, Joint Development Zone, Korea-Japan Talk, Law of Sea