초록 열기/닫기 버튼
The corporate governance has been the focus on control functions of organizations of a company such as board of directors, supervisory board, or general meetings, etc. during the last decades, however, these days the external monitoring, especially institutional investors become more powerful in securities market. The profile of optimal monitor seemingly includes the following elements: (1) an ability to hold large equity stakes; (2) an inclination to hold for the longer term over which improved monitoring can pay off; and (3) the absence of any substantial conflict of interest. On this basis, pension funds seem potentially superior to banks and other creditor-shareholders. However, as well as the composition of the board of trustees in pension funds, the differences in boards' responsibilities, practices, and policies should have an impact on the plan's funding status and performance. Therefore, the board of trustees must be able to prevent the political misuse of the fund's assets and have the expertise and motivation to ensure successful investment performance. Similar to the envisioned for independent directors in corporate governance, there is a role for member-elected trustees. These trustees are motivated, accountable to plan beneficiaries, and independent of political influence. Accordingly, the board of trustees should be organized as the majority of the elected trustees than ex officio trustees and appointed trustees. Moreover, all trustees are subject to a "prudent person" requirement by legislation, which is similar to the corporate directors' duty of care standard.
키워드열기/닫기 버튼
institutional investor, pension fund, corporate governance, board of trustee, governance structure
