김광수는 정신의 자율성은 심리철학이 설명해야 할 피설명항이기 때문에, 정신의 자율성을 받아들이지 않는 것은 이 피설명항을 부정하는 것이 된다고 주장한다. 그러나 나는 정신(적인 것)의 자율성이 심리철학의 피설명항임을 부정하는 것이 아니라 유일한 피설명항임을 부정하는 것이다. 심신 간의 인과적 상호작용은 세계의 존재론적 무차별성 내지 단일성 또한 심리철학이 설명해야 할 피설명항이 되게 한다. 심신 문제란 바로 이 두 피설명항 간의 긴장관계를 설명해야 하는 것이기 때문에 김광수의 정신(적인 것)의 자율성 주장은 그 주장만으로는 설득력을 갖기에 부족하며 그것의 근거를 따로 제시해야 한다. 하지만 김광수는 정신의 자율성이 직접적 경험을 통해 알게 된 “인간 현상”이기 때문에 더 이상의 근거를 제시할 수 없다고 주장한다. 그러면서 그것을 “이론이나 가설이 아닌 사실”이라고도 한다. 하지만 이런 부적절한 용어법을 통해 정신(적인 것)의 자율성에 대한 근거제시를 회피할 수는 없을 것 같다.

Kwang Su Kim insists that the autonomy of the mental is the explanandum of the philosophy of mind. So, he said, unless I accept the autonomy of the mental, I deny the explanandum. But what I deny is not that the autonomy of the mental is the explanandum of the philosophy of mind, but that the autonomy of the mental is the only explanandum of the philosophy of mind. Psychophysical causal interactions make ontological indiscernibility of the world also an explanandum of the philosophy of mind. The Mind-Body Problem is the very problem to harmonize these two explananda, both of which seem not to be true together. So, to assert only an explanandum to be so evident that need not be justified any more, is not enough to support it, if not considering another one at all. However, Kim insists that the autonomy of the mental cannot be supported any more because it is a “human phenomenon” acquainted by direct experience. Furthermore, he asserts it to be a fact, neither a theory nor a hypothesis. But this irrelevant philosophical terminology, which equates ‘phenomenon’ with ‘fact’, cannot avoid the requirement of more justification.

Kwang Su Kim insists that the autonomy of the mental is the explanandum of the philosophy of mind. So, he said, unless I accept the autonomy of the mental, I deny the explanandum. But what I deny is not that the autonomy of the mental is the explanandum of the philosophy of mind, but that the autonomy of the mental is the only explanandum of the philosophy of mind. Psychophysical causal interactions make ontological indiscernibility of the world also an explanandum of the philosophy of mind. The Mind-Body Problem is the very problem to harmonize these two explananda, both of which seem not to be true together. So, to assert only an explanandum to be so evident that need not be justified any more, is not enough to support it, if not considering another one at all. However, Kim insists that the autonomy of the mental cannot be supported any more because it is a “human phenomenon” acquainted by direct experience. Furthermore, he asserts it to be a fact, neither a theory nor a hypothesis. But this irrelevant philosophical terminology, which equates ‘phenomenon’ with ‘fact’, cannot avoid the requirement of more justification.

Property dualism, the autonomy of the mental, ontological indiscernibility, Kwang Su Kim