초록 열기/닫기 버튼
맥키는 Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong의 첫 부분에서 윤리 또는 도덕에 관한 소위 '오류론'을 제시한다. 블랙번은 맥키의 일상도덕에 관한 오류론을 여러 논문과 저서에서 비판하는 바, 이 글에서는 다음의 주장을 논증하고자 한다. 만일 블랙번 본인의 진리이론 곧 진리에 대한 정합론을 수용하면, 맥키의 도덕오류론이 틀렸다는 점을 보이기 위해 굳이 블랙번의 비판을 빌릴 필요가 없게 된다. 따라서 이글은 블랙번의 오류론에 대한 지적사항을 비판적으로 파헤치며, 만일 이글의 논증이 타당하다면, 블랙번의 도덕유사실재론에로의 하나의 동기가 사라짐을 보여주게 된다.
In this paper, I argue that Simon Blackburn's coherence theory of general truth opens the door for an attack on J.L. Mackie's error theory that is quite different from the one that he himself offers. If Blackburn's coherence theory of general truth (and his theory on its corresponding notion of general objectivity) is correct, then it is no longer clear that there are no generally objective moral values. More specifically, Blackburn's coherence theory of truth may serve as grounds for rejecting part of Mackie's error theory, viz. "there are no objective values, moral or otherwise." Blackburn, nonetheless, focused on the other part of error theory, viz. "one who is engaged in ordinary normative moral practice uses moral language to express moral judgments and these judgments imply that moral values are objective," and it certainly seems to allow him to save his antirealist root. If the motivation behind Blackburn's projectivism and quasi-realism is to defend the ordinary normative moral practices against the error theorist's charge--namely, moral judgments and beliefs that are expressed by moral language involves no error--, then as I shall argue it requires no additional help from these theories other than that the coherence theory of general truth may afford.
키워드열기/닫기 버튼
Error Theory, Quasi-Realism, the Coherence Theory of Truth, Simon Blackburn, J.L. Mackie
