Due to great efforts to raise production efficiency by both the unions and the Stalinist leadership, the outcomes achieved their aims to a certain level even before the Stakhanovite movement. In this situation the unexpected record-breaking achievement of Stakhanov in the autumn of 1935 provided a valuable opportunity to accelerate the drive of production efficiency. However, the official reaction of the party to the movement in the fourth quarter of 1935 was not immediate, and neither was that of the leadership of the unions. Until the beginning of the Stakhanovite movement, the unions had been turning their key tasks from mobilization for production to the welfare for workers and discussing how to include such a shift in their future charter. The Stakhanovite movement in the autumn of 1935, however, required the unions to turn their attention back to production. Yet the movement in September and October was not a top priority for the VTsSPS leadership as it devoted itself to work with party leaders. Thus the unions’ response to the Stakhanovite movement was delayed. The union meeting in November 1935, shortly after the Stakhanovite Conference, revealed their confusion as well as their reorientation. Only with the party plenum in December did VTsSPS secretaries finally commit themselves to the promotion of the campaign. Once the Stakhanovite movement turned into a national campaign, the unions again played the role of ‘production vanguard’. Yet this time the unions were concerned not only with the mobilization of workers but also with the output norm-revision and the provision of differentiated services for Stakhanovite workers. The Stakhanovite campaign, however, did not achieve what the Stalinist leadership wanted, and it rapidly declined from early 1936. The anti-sabotage campaign was also withdrawn in March. In addition, the enthusiasm of the movement was rapidly exhausted from April.

Due to great efforts to raise production efficiency by both the unions and the Stalinist leadership, the outcomes achieved their aims to a certain level even before the Stakhanovite movement. In this situation the unexpected record-breaking achievement of Stakhanov in the autumn of 1935 provided a valuable opportunity to accelerate the drive of production efficiency. However, the official reaction of the party to the movement in the fourth quarter of 1935 was not immediate, and neither was that of the leadership of the unions. Until the beginning of the Stakhanovite movement, the unions had been turning their key tasks from mobilization for production to the welfare for workers and discussing how to include such a shift in their future charter. The Stakhanovite movement in the autumn of 1935, however, required the unions to turn their attention back to production. Yet the movement in September and October was not a top priority for the VTsSPS leadership as it devoted itself to work with party leaders. Thus the unions’ response to the Stakhanovite movement was delayed. The union meeting in November 1935, shortly after the Stakhanovite Conference, revealed their confusion as well as their reorientation. Only with the party plenum in December did VTsSPS secretaries finally commit themselves to the promotion of the campaign. Once the Stakhanovite movement turned into a national campaign, the unions again played the role of ‘production vanguard’. Yet this time the unions were concerned not only with the mobilization of workers but also with the output norm-revision and the provision of differentiated services for Stakhanovite workers. The Stakhanovite campaign, however, did not achieve what the Stalinist leadership wanted, and it rapidly declined from early 1936. The anti-sabotage campaign was also withdrawn in March. In addition, the enthusiasm of the movement was rapidly exhausted from April.