이 글은 미국의 파트너십 과세제도를 기초로 2009년부터 시행된 우리나라의 동업기업과세제도에 대하여 이 제도의 핵심적 주제라 할 수 있는 손익배분비율과 관련하여 우리나라의 제도가 미국의 파트너십 과세제도와 어떤 차이가 있는지를 비교법적으로 고찰하고 개선방안을 제언하기 위한 것이다. 이와 관련, 미국식의 특별배분(Special Allocation), 즉 다양한 손익배분비율을 세법상 인정하는 파트너십 과세제도가 단일의 손익배분비율만 인정하는 우리나라의 동업기업 과세방식과 차이를 야기하는 가장 큰 요인은 동업기업의 재무 및 영업활동에 따른 동업자들의 경제적 실질을 반영하는 자본계정(Capital Accounts) 개념에 착안하여, 이 개념의 기능과 작동원리, 동업자들의 지분에 대한 세무상 원가인 지분가액(Outside Basis)과의 차이점 등을 고찰해본 다음, 이 개념의 도입을 통한 다양한 손익배분비율을 허용하는 방식의 동업기업과세제도의 개선 가능성을 제시하고자 한다. 결론에 있어서, 미국식 파트너십 과세제도를 도입하면서 기업 활동의 다양성과 유연성의 제고 및 조세의 중립성 확보라는 투시과세 제도의 긍정적 가치를 배제한 채, 현행의 동업기업과세제도가 조세회피의 가능성만을 우려하여 단일의 손익배분비율만을 인정한 입법태도는 재고가 필요하며, 점진적인 허용의 방향으로 개선이 필요하다는 점, 이러한 다양한 손익배분비율을 허용하는 경우 이 세제를 이용한 조세회피행위를 방지할 개념적 도구로써 자본계정 제도를 도입하여 지분가액 제도와 이원적으로 운용할 필요가 있음을 주장한다.

The purpose of this article is to study the allocation rules under the newly adopted Korean partnership taxation in comparison with the special allocation rule under the U.S. partnership taxation, the model system to which Korea follows, and to suggest reconsidering the current allocation rule of allowing only a monolithic allocation ratio while prohibiting flexible allocation arrangement among partners. As a result of the comparative analysis between both the cross－Pacific countries, the most critical factor distinguishing the monolithic Korean allocation rule from the U.S. special allocations is caused by the lack of the "Capital Account" based on the real economic substantiality among partners apart from the "Outside Basis" devised only for the tax purpose. Under the Korea's partnership taxation regime, the concept of the Capital Account has no independent meaning from the Outside Basis, whereby the Outside Basis always replaces the Capital Account by disallowing the non－recognition of the built－in gain or loss at the time of the contribution of the property(i.e., stepped－up basis), and further restricting a variety of autonomous allocation arrangements to which the economic substantiality could be preserved only upon the strict rules for the maintenance of the Capital Account. Based on such analysis, this article deals with the functional operation of the capital account in terms of partnership accounting and the substantial economic effect test (i.e., SEET) under the U.S. Treasury regulations, and finally the possibility of the introduction of the capital account separately from the outside basis in Korea. From the policy standpoint, this article suggests that even though it reflects the fear of the tax avoidance maneuvers using the loopholes of this new tax system, the current allocation rule of Korea's partnership taxation should be reconsidered toward permitting autonomous allocation arrangement among partners not only because the new partnership taxation was introduced to maximize the advantageous features of the pass－through taxation such as the diversity and flexibility of the business formation and to secure the tax neutrality among various enterprises, but also because it is the key factor to recognize the autonomous allocation arrangement for the accomplishment of the underlying purpose of this new tax system.

The purpose of this article is to study the allocation rules under the newly adopted Korean partnership taxation in comparison with the special allocation rule under the U.S. partnership taxation, the model system to which Korea follows, and to suggest reconsidering the current allocation rule of allowing only a monolithic allocation ratio while prohibiting flexible allocation arrangement among partners. As a result of the comparative analysis between both the cross－Pacific countries, the most critical factor distinguishing the monolithic Korean allocation rule from the U.S. special allocations is caused by the lack of the "Capital Account" based on the real economic substantiality among partners apart from the "Outside Basis" devised only for the tax purpose. Under the Korea's partnership taxation regime, the concept of the Capital Account has no independent meaning from the Outside Basis, whereby the Outside Basis always replaces the Capital Account by disallowing the non－recognition of the built－in gain or loss at the time of the contribution of the property(i.e., stepped－up basis), and further restricting a variety of autonomous allocation arrangements to which the economic substantiality could be preserved only upon the strict rules for the maintenance of the Capital Account. Based on such analysis, this article deals with the functional operation of the capital account in terms of partnership accounting and the substantial economic effect test (i.e., SEET) under the U.S. Treasury regulations, and finally the possibility of the introduction of the capital account separately from the outside basis in Korea. From the policy standpoint, this article suggests that even though it reflects the fear of the tax avoidance maneuvers using the loopholes of this new tax system, the current allocation rule of Korea's partnership taxation should be reconsidered toward permitting autonomous allocation arrangement among partners not only because the new partnership taxation was introduced to maximize the advantageous features of the pass－through taxation such as the diversity and flexibility of the business formation and to secure the tax neutrality among various enterprises, but also because it is the key factor to recognize the autonomous allocation arrangement for the accomplishment of the underlying purpose of this new tax system.

Partnership, Capital Account, Outside Basis, Special Allocation, Economic Effect