공정공시제도란 기업이 애널리스트나 기관투자가 등 특정인에게 선별적으로 중요한 정보를 제공하고자 하는 경우 모든 시장참가자들이 동 정보를 알 수 있도록 그 특정인에게 제공하기 전에 증권시장을 통해 공시하도록 하는 제도이다. 공정공시의 대상이 되는 정보 중 하나가 매출액, 영업손익, 경상손익 또는 당기순손익 등에 대한 전망치 또는 예측치이다. 미국의 선행연구에 의하면 자발적으로 이익예측치를 발표한 경영자는 해당 예측치가 사후적으로 실현되는 이익에 비해 과대 공시된 것으로 밝혀지면 주식시장에서의 부정적인 주가반응뿐만 아니라 경영자의 평판이 손상될 위험과 법적인 책임까지도 부담할 수 있다. 따라서, 이익예측치를 공시한 경영자는 보고이익이 해당 예측치에 미달하는 것을 피하기 위하여 이익을 상향 조정할 유인을 갖는다. 하지만 우리나라의 경우 경제 환경과 법적 환경이 미국과 달라 경영자가 자신이 과거에 발표한 이익예측치를 달성하지 못하더라도 불이익을 받는지는 분명하지 않다. 따라서, 우리나라에서 자발적으로 이익예측치를 공시한 경영자가 보고이익이 해당 예측치에 미달하는 것을 피하기 위하여 이익을 상향 조정하는지는 실증분석의 대상이다. 이에 본 연구는 공정공시를 통해 이익예측치를 발표한 경영자가 사후적으로 실현되는 이익이 이미 발표된 이익예측치에 미달할 것으로 예상되는 경우 이익을 상향 조정하는지를 검토한다. 실증분석 결과, 공정공시를 통하여 발표한 전망치가 실현되는 연도의 재량적발생액 자체는 기타 연도의 재량적발생액과 유의하게 다르지 않다. 하지만, 전망치가 실현되는 연도만을 대상으로 분석한 결과 이익을 조정하기 전의 이익이 이미 발표된 예측치에 미달할 것으로 예상되는 경우에는 재량적발생액을 이용하여 이익을 상향 조정하는 것으로 나타난다. 또한, 이익조정 전의 이익이 경영자가 이미 발표한 이익예측치에 미달하는 정도가 클수록 재량적발생액은 커진다. 이는 미국과 우리나라의 경제 환경이나 법적 환경이 다르다고 하더라도 우리나라의 경영자 또한 자신이 이미 발표한 이익예측치를 달성하고자 하는 유인을 가짐을 의미한다. 선행연구에 의하면 기업지배구조는 기업의 이익조정을 억제하는 역할을 하는 것으로 보고되었다. 하지만, 본 연구에서는 기업지배구조가 재량적발생액을 이용한 이익의 상향 조정을 억제하지 못하는 것으로 나타난다.

Prior to Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD), many firms disclosed important nonpublic information to securities analysts or selected institutional investors, before making public disclosure of the same information. Where this has happened, those who were privy to the information beforehand were able to make a profit at the expense of the general public. Thus, Reg FD was introduced in 2002 to level the playing field and thereby to reduce information asymmetry among market participants. Reg FD requires that when corporate management discloses material nonpublic information to a few privileged market participants, he must make public disclosure of that information. Reg FD specifies types of material information that trigger Reg FD obligations. One of them is forward-looking information about forthcoming earnings. Prior research conducted in the US suggests that firms beating earnings benchmarks enjoy higher returns than those missing the benchmarks. Management earnings forecasts can serve as earnings benchmarks. In addition, managers may face legal actions by shareholders and lose their reputation if they miss their earnings forecasts. Thus, managers in the US have incentives to manage earnings upward to achieve their earnings forecasts. The capital market and legal environment in Korea differ from those in the US. That is, there is no evidence that investors either penalize or take any legal action against managers who miss their forecasts in Korea. Thus, it is an empirical question whether managers who issue earnings forecasts manage earnings upward to meet or beat their forecasts in Korea. This study investigates whether Korean managers who issue earnings forecasts through fair disclosures manage earnings upward to meet or beat their forecasts. The empirical results reveal that in general discretionary accruals of the forecast year are not different from those of other years. However, when pre-managed earnings fall short of management earnings forecasts, firms use income-increasing discretionary accruals. Furthermore, discretionary accruals are positively associated with the difference between management forecasts and pre-managed earnings. These results suggest that even in Korea managers manage earnings upward when pre-managed earnings fall short of their forecasts. Prior research also suggests that strong corporate governance deters managers' income－increasing accounting decisions. However, there is no significant association between corporate governance and earnings management acitivity for our sample firms.

Prior to Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD), many firms disclosed important nonpublic information to securities analysts or selected institutional investors, before making public disclosure of the same information. Where this has happened, those who were privy to the information beforehand were able to make a profit at the expense of the general public. Thus, Reg FD was introduced in 2002 to level the playing field and thereby to reduce information asymmetry among market participants. Reg FD requires that when corporate management discloses material nonpublic information to a few privileged market participants, he must make public disclosure of that information. Reg FD specifies types of material information that trigger Reg FD obligations. One of them is forward-looking information about forthcoming earnings. Prior research conducted in the US suggests that firms beating earnings benchmarks enjoy higher returns than those missing the benchmarks. Management earnings forecasts can serve as earnings benchmarks. In addition, managers may face legal actions by shareholders and lose their reputation if they miss their earnings forecasts. Thus, managers in the US have incentives to manage earnings upward to achieve their earnings forecasts. The capital market and legal environment in Korea differ from those in the US. That is, there is no evidence that investors either penalize or take any legal action against managers who miss their forecasts in Korea. Thus, it is an empirical question whether managers who issue earnings forecasts manage earnings upward to meet or beat their forecasts in Korea. This study investigates whether Korean managers who issue earnings forecasts through fair disclosures manage earnings upward to meet or beat their forecasts. The empirical results reveal that in general discretionary accruals of the forecast year are not different from those of other years. However, when pre-managed earnings fall short of management earnings forecasts, firms use income-increasing discretionary accruals. Furthermore, discretionary accruals are positively associated with the difference between management forecasts and pre-managed earnings. These results suggest that even in Korea managers manage earnings upward when pre-managed earnings fall short of their forecasts. Prior research also suggests that strong corporate governance deters managers' income－increasing accounting decisions. However, there is no significant association between corporate governance and earnings management acitivity for our sample firms.

Reg FD, selective disclosure, information asymmetry, management earnings forecasts, earnings management, discretionary accruals