철학의 역사는 “철학, 그것은 무엇인가?”라는 물음에 대한 대답 의 역사로써 구성된다. 헤라클레이토스는 이 물음에 대해 ‘로고스를 닮아나가 는 일’이라고 대답했다. 그의 응답은 로고스에 대한 논리적 증명이 아니라 서 사적 제시의 형태로써 이루어졌다. 이러한 응답의 형식은 당시의 언어적 한 계에 따른 것일 수도 있지만, 근본적으로는 그가 그 자신을 놀랍게 사로잡았 던 탐구 대상(소폰, 헨 판타)에 이끌렸기 때문이라고 볼 수 있다. 놀라움의 감정이 누그러들자 곧바로 후대 철학자들(플라톤, 아리스토텔레스) 은 그 놀라움의 대상을 ‘그것이 있는 그대로’ 냉철하게 관조하려 했다. 그들은 대상을 분석하고, 전체를 체계적으로 종합하며, 형이상학적 패러다임을 짜나갔 다. 이러한 설명의 틀은 서양의 중세와 근대를 거치면서 계승되고 발전되었다. 심지어 데카르트조차도 그 틀에서 벗어나지 못하고 있다. 데카르트는 언뜻 놀라움과는 전혀 다른 의심의 기분에 의해 철학을 시작하고 있는 듯 보이지 만, 그가 처음부터 의심의 기능을 확실성을 얻기 위한 방향으로 맞춰 놓은 이상, 데카르트도 놀라움의 기분과 다른 기분에서 철학한 것이라고 볼 수 없 다. 오히려 그는 수학과 과학의 냉철함 또는 증명에 대한 열망에 사로잡혀 있었다. 이러한 감정은 고대 철학자들이 꿈꾸었던 ‘영원에 대한 열망’과 크게 다르지 않다. 모든 대답은 물음을 전제로 한다. ‘물음과 대답’은 다시금 응답의 구체적 형 태이다. 만일 이 말이 맞다면, 우리는 ‘물음과 대답’ 이전에 ‘응답의 사건’에 주목할 필요가 있다. 응답은 부르는 것에 대한 직접적 경험으로부터 주어진다. 우리가 2천 5백년 이상을 이어온 서양 철학의 역사를 ‘응답의 역사’로 재해석 할 수 있다면, 오늘날 우리가 던지는 “철학, 그것은 무엇인가?”라는 물음 또 한 철학의 사태로부터 들려오는 하나의 부름이 되어야 한다. 이 부름 앞에 서 우리는 무엇보다 우리들 자신을 근원적으로 조율하고 있는 근본 기분을 밝혀보아야 할 것이다. 왜냐하면 대답은 바로 그 기분에서부터 그 나름의 방 향을 지시받고 있기 때문이다.

The history of philosophy is constituted by the history of answers to the question “philosophy, what is it?” To this question, Heraclitus answered ‘trying to resemble logos.’ His response was not alogical proof concerning logos, but was made in the form of epical narrations. The form of his response could be due to the limitations of his language at that time, but it was rather because he was surprised and attracted by the objects of research(σοφόν, ΈνΠάντα) in a more fundamental sense. As soon as the mood of surprise was subdued, the following philosophers like Plato and Aristotle tried to observe those objects of surprise dispassionately ‘as they really are.’ They analyzed them, synthesized them into a systematic whole, and continued to frame metaphysical paradigms. These frames were handed down to the Middle Ages and to the modern times in great development. Even Descartes was not able to get out of these frames completely. Although Descartes seems to start his philosophy from the mood of doubt, not from that of surprise, he was set to obtain certainty through the mood of doubt; and we can not say that Descartes philosophized in a mood totally different from that of surprise. Rather, he was obsessed with the yearnings for mathematical, scientific coldness and for such proof. This kind of mood is not radically different from the ‘yearning for eternity’ that ancient philosophers cherished. Every answer presupposes a question. ‘Question and answer’ are again a reified form of calling and response. If this is truly the case, we have to pay attention to the ‘occurrences of response’ before ‘question and answer.’ Response is given as a concrete experience of a calling. If we can re-interpret the 2500 years of Western philosophy as a ‘history of responses’, our question “philosophy, what is it?” should also be a calling from the occurrences of philosophy themselves. As the calling echoes, we have to enlighten the basic moods that attune us our selves fundamentally above all things. For answering is already being directed by these basic moods.

The history of philosophy is constituted by the history of answers to the question “philosophy, what is it?” To this question, Heraclitus answered ‘trying to resemble logos.’ His response was not alogical proof concerning logos, but was made in the form of epical narrations. The form of his response could be due to the limitations of his language at that time, but it was rather because he was surprised and attracted by the objects of research(σοφόν, ΈνΠάντα) in a more fundamental sense. As soon as the mood of surprise was subdued, the following philosophers like Plato and Aristotle tried to observe those objects of surprise dispassionately ‘as they really are.’ They analyzed them, synthesized them into a systematic whole, and continued to frame metaphysical paradigms. These frames were handed down to the Middle Ages and to the modern times in great development. Even Descartes was not able to get out of these frames completely. Although Descartes seems to start his philosophy from the mood of doubt, not from that of surprise, he was set to obtain certainty through the mood of doubt; and we can not say that Descartes philosophized in a mood totally different from that of surprise. Rather, he was obsessed with the yearnings for mathematical, scientific coldness and for such proof. This kind of mood is not radically different from the ‘yearning for eternity’ that ancient philosophers cherished. Every answer presupposes a question. ‘Question and answer’ are again a reified form of calling and response. If this is truly the case, we have to pay attention to the ‘occurrences of response’ before ‘question and answer.’ Response is given as a concrete experience of a calling. If we can re-interpret the 2500 years of Western philosophy as a ‘history of responses’, our question “philosophy, what is it?” should also be a calling from the occurrences of philosophy themselves. As the calling echoes, we have to enlighten the basic moods that attune us our selves fundamentally above all things. For answering is already being directed by these basic moods.

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philosophy, hen panta, episteme, theory, surprise, operation, certainty