저항권은 기존 헌법질서가 전면적으로 부정되는 극한적인 상황에서 기존 헌법을 지키기 위하여만 행사할 수 있다는 것이 우리나라의 통설이다. 논자는 위와 같은 저항권 이론의 타당성과 유용성에 의문을 제기한다. 첫째, 저항권과 혁명권을 준별하여 헌법상 저항권만 인정되고 혁명권은 인정되지 않는다고 하는 것은 독일의 특수한 전통에 바탕을 둔 이론이다. 이것은 서구의 전통적인 저항권 이론과 궤를 달리할 뿐 아니라, 동양의 전통적 저항권이론인 천명사상과도 조화되지 않는다. 둘째, 저항권행사의 요건들을 모두 충족하는 것은 오늘날 민주주의 국가에서 거의 불가능한 일이다. 이러한 이론은 저항권을 지극히 관념적인 불모의 권리로 전락시키고 말았다. 이러한 문제점들을 해결하기 위해서는 저항권을 일상적인 기본권으로 새롭게 발전시킬 것이 요청된다. 그것은 저항권과 시민불복종의 만남을 의미한다. 새롭게 태어날 저항권은 단순히 실정헌법의 수호수단이 아니라 자연적 정의를 지키기 위한 인권이 되어야 한다.

The conventional theory in Korea argues that the right of resistance can be exercised only in an extreme situation where the basic constitutional order is totally denied, and only for the purpose of guarding the current constitution rather than establishing a new one. The author doubts the validity and utility of the theory. First, the clear distinction between resistance and revolution is based on the conventional theory and the constitutional precedent in Germany. The German theory is not in line with the traditional theory of right of resistance in the West as well as with the traditional theory of justice, i. e. the Divine-Order-Theory, in China and Korea. This is due to the fact that the German theory was based on its historical and legal backgrounds that Korea and even the other Western countries do not have. Second, the conditions for the exercise of the right of resistance can hardly be fulfilled in modern democratic countries, and even contradict one another. Thus the author suggests that the “right of resistance” be re-conceptualized as an ordinary right that can be exercised before the extraordinary situation comes. The envisioned new theory will combine the conventional right of resistance and civil disobedience. This essay does not present a new theory. But rather it argues that a new theory is necessary from both ideal and realistic perspective, and a new theory is plausible under Korean Constitution.

The conventional theory in Korea argues that the right of resistance can be exercised only in an extreme situation where the basic constitutional order is totally denied, and only for the purpose of guarding the current constitution rather than establishing a new one. The author doubts the validity and utility of the theory. First, the clear distinction between resistance and revolution is based on the conventional theory and the constitutional precedent in Germany. The German theory is not in line with the traditional theory of right of resistance in the West as well as with the traditional theory of justice, i. e. the Divine-Order-Theory, in China and Korea. This is due to the fact that the German theory was based on its historical and legal backgrounds that Korea and even the other Western countries do not have. Second, the conditions for the exercise of the right of resistance can hardly be fulfilled in modern democratic countries, and even contradict one another. Thus the author suggests that the “right of resistance” be re-conceptualized as an ordinary right that can be exercised before the extraordinary situation comes. The envisioned new theory will combine the conventional right of resistance and civil disobedience. This essay does not present a new theory. But rather it argues that a new theory is necessary from both ideal and realistic perspective, and a new theory is plausible under Korean Constitution.

right of revolution, right of rebellion, right of resistance, civil disobedience, natural justice, traditional theory of justice in China and Korea