한정위헌결정과 한정위헌청구를 둘러싼 법원과 헌법재판소 간의 논란은 근본적으로 법률과 법률해석의 관계, 법률해석권한의 귀속, 법률해석과 헌법재판의 관계에 관한 문제에서 비롯된다. 이와 관련하여, 법률 자체와 법률해석은 구분되고, 법률해석은 헌법해석과는 달리 헌법재판소가 아니라 법원의 소관사항이라는 두 개의 견고한 명제가 있다. 그러나 법률 자체와 법률해석은 분리된 별개의 것이 아니어서, 규범통제라는 것은 본질적으로 혹은 상당 부분은 규범해석통제일 수밖에 없다. 그리고 법원은 ‘법률해석’이라는 이름으로 실질적인 의미에서 헌법재판작용(규범통제)을 하고, 헌법재판소는 법률해석의 방식으로 ‘헌법재판’을 행하기도 하는데, 헌법해석이 상충하는 경우에는 헌법재판소의 해석이 우위를 가지고, 법률해석이 상충하는 경우에는 양 기관의 해석이 병존하는 경우도 있고, 헌법재판소의 법률해석이 우위를 가지는 경우도 있다. 또한 헌법과 기본권의 전방위적 기능과 효력으로 인해 헌법으로부터 격리된 일반 법률질서의 독자적 영역이란 것은 인정될 여지가 좁고, 헌법질서와 법률질서의 관계는 시간과 관여자의 참여적 행위에 따라 동태적으로 파악되며 과정과 절차를 통해 법률질서에 헌법이 개입하고 이로써 법률질서가 새로이 수정·확인된다. 다만, 재판소원이 금지되므로 헌법문제화 되기 이전 단계의 일반 법률해석, 구체적 사건에의 적용과 포섭, 사실인정과 같은 법원의 고유한 재판영역에 개입하지 않아야 한다는 데에 규범해석통제의 한계가 있다. 덧붙여 헌법재판소의 규범통제권한의 범위와 한계를 설정함에 있어서는 몇 가지 기능법적 관점을 통한 보완이 필요하다.

The controversies over the decision of 'limited unconstitutionality' and the 'request for the decision of limited unconstitutionality' between the ordinary courts and the Constitutional Court are rooted in three problems: Relationship between law(here: Constitution excluded) and its interpretation, allocation of interpretative power, and the connection between legal interpretation and constitutional adjudication. In relation to this matter, there has been two firm propositions : ⓐ Law itself is distinguished from its interpretation. ⓑ Ordinary courts have exclusive power over legal interpretation. However, a law cannot be separated from its interpretation, and therefore constitutional review is essentially or considerably an interpretative control. The ordinary courts exercise constitutional adjudication in the name of 'legal interpretation', and the Constitutional Court performs 'constitutional adjudication' by the method of legal interpretation. Providing that constitutional interpretations conflict, the Constitutional Court's interpretation is superior to another's. In case of legal interpretations conflicting, they may coexist or the Constitutional Court's interpretation is superior to another's. As our Constitution and basic rights have omnidirectional function and effect, legal order hardly has its own realm separate from that of constitutional order. The relationship between legal order and constitutional order should be dynamically understood varying with time and participation. The constitution intervenes in legal order in the judicial process and procedure, thus newly modifying or confirming the legal order. As constitutional complaint against judical judgements is not allowed, constitutional review should not intervene in ordinary courts' own jurisdiction like legal interpretation without constitutional problems, the application of a law subsuming a concrete case, and fact-finding. In establishing the scope and limitation of the Constitutional Court's power of constitutional review, some functional points of view need to be taken complementarily.

The controversies over the decision of 'limited unconstitutionality' and the 'request for the decision of limited unconstitutionality' between the ordinary courts and the Constitutional Court are rooted in three problems: Relationship between law(here: Constitution excluded) and its interpretation, allocation of interpretative power, and the connection between legal interpretation and constitutional adjudication. In relation to this matter, there has been two firm propositions : ⓐ Law itself is distinguished from its interpretation. ⓑ Ordinary courts have exclusive power over legal interpretation. However, a law cannot be separated from its interpretation, and therefore constitutional review is essentially or considerably an interpretative control. The ordinary courts exercise constitutional adjudication in the name of 'legal interpretation', and the Constitutional Court performs 'constitutional adjudication' by the method of legal interpretation. Providing that constitutional interpretations conflict, the Constitutional Court's interpretation is superior to another's. In case of legal interpretations conflicting, they may coexist or the Constitutional Court's interpretation is superior to another's. As our Constitution and basic rights have omnidirectional function and effect, legal order hardly has its own realm separate from that of constitutional order. The relationship between legal order and constitutional order should be dynamically understood varying with time and participation. The constitution intervenes in legal order in the judicial process and procedure, thus newly modifying or confirming the legal order. As constitutional complaint against judical judgements is not allowed, constitutional review should not intervene in ordinary courts' own jurisdiction like legal interpretation without constitutional problems, the application of a law subsuming a concrete case, and fact-finding. In establishing the scope and limitation of the Constitutional Court's power of constitutional review, some functional points of view need to be taken complementarily.

legal interpretation, limited unconstitutionality, constitutional review, interpretative control, constitutional complaint against judical judgements