피터즈의 선험적 정당화 논의는, 한 개인이 그 가치를 인정하는가의 여부와는 상관없이, 이론적 지식은 마음을 형성하는 데에 가치가 있다는 것을 설명하기 위한 것이다. 그러나 그의 논의는 이론적 지식에 의하여 형성된 마음, 예컨대 수학적 사고력 등의 가치를 묻는 질문에 대해서는 그가 애써 부정하려고 노력한, 일상생활의 필요에 의한 교육의 정당화 논의와 별다른 대답을 내어놓을 수 없는 것으로 귀결된다. 그의 논의가 이와 같이 귀결되는 것은 그의 논의가 칸트의 선험철학의 ‘내용’을 배제한 채 칸트의 논의 ‘형식’만을 빌려 왔기 때문이다. 만약 피터즈가 그의 말 그대로 칸트의 논의 형식만을 수정함으로써 칸트의 논의 내용을 그대로 수용했더라면, 그의 선험적 정당화 논의는 교과를 성립시키기 위하여 반드시 있다고 보지 않으면 안되는 논리적 가정, 즉 이념이 형성되는 과정을 자세히 설명했어야 마땅하다. 이런 식의 설명을 하기 위해서는 불교에서는 마음이 어떤 과정을 거쳐 진여에 이르게 된다고 설명하는지를 고찰할 필요가 있다. 이렇게 말하고 보면, 교육의 선험적 정당화 논의가 본래의 모습을 갖추기 위해서는 피터즈의 선험적 논의 형식에서 칸트의 선험철학의 내용, 즉 형이상학적 요소를 되살려내는 것은 물론이요, 더 나아가 수행을 통한 마음의 해탈과정에 관한 불교의 이론적 설명의 도움을 받아야 하는 것으로 된다.

In his transcendental argument for the justification of curriculum, Peters attempts to show that theoretical activities should be pursued for the intrinsic value which is distinct from the extrinsic value. But it is doubtful that he gives a full explanation for the intrinsic value of the school subjects, for, in the end, his argument cannot but introduce into the school subjects such extrinsic value as a need of everyday life which he intends to reject. His argument as it stands cannot provide a justification of an educated mind without relying on any extrinsic value. This unexpected conclusion of his argument can be taken as the inevitable result from his eliminating the element of metaphysics from Kant's transcendental philosophy. If Peters could accept the element of metaphysics implied in Kant's transcendental philosophy, and reformulate Kant's argument from the educational point of view, he would not fail to maintain that the mind of the pupil, in the process of learning the school subjects, leads to and is cultivated by the Reality. In Buddhism, we can find an explanation of the process of transforming the mind(or 'illusion') into the reality(or 'suchness'). With the aid of the Buddhist theory, the transcendental argument for the justification of curriculum could take a more complete form. Thus, if the transcendental justification is to be clearly distinguished from an instrumental justification, it needs to reintroduce the metaphysics of Kant's philosophy and, at the same time, accept the Buddhist theory of the process of leading the mind to the Reality.

In his transcendental argument for the justification of curriculum, Peters attempts to show that theoretical activities should be pursued for the intrinsic value which is distinct from the extrinsic value. But it is doubtful that he gives a full explanation for the intrinsic value of the school subjects, for, in the end, his argument cannot but introduce into the school subjects such extrinsic value as a need of everyday life which he intends to reject. His argument as it stands cannot provide a justification of an educated mind without relying on any extrinsic value. This unexpected conclusion of his argument can be taken as the inevitable result from his eliminating the element of metaphysics from Kant's transcendental philosophy. If Peters could accept the element of metaphysics implied in Kant's transcendental philosophy, and reformulate Kant's argument from the educational point of view, he would not fail to maintain that the mind of the pupil, in the process of learning the school subjects, leads to and is cultivated by the Reality. In Buddhism, we can find an explanation of the process of transforming the mind(or 'illusion') into the reality(or 'suchness'). With the aid of the Buddhist theory, the transcendental argument for the justification of curriculum could take a more complete form. Thus, if the transcendental justification is to be clearly distinguished from an instrumental justification, it needs to reintroduce the metaphysics of Kant's philosophy and, at the same time, accept the Buddhist theory of the process of leading the mind to the Reality.

transcendental justification, Peters, Kant, Buddhism, curriculum.