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The paper deals with two issues: The author’s approach to the Basic Agreement and analysis of Russia – North Korea relations. The author defends two points. First, the central problem in evaluating of the meaning of the Basic Agreement is that the previous conceptual basis for the Agreement – “One country – two systems” – was meaningful only in the Cold War period. The logic behind its existence was provided by the geopolitical rivalry between the USSR and the US. Nowadays the world is totally different as the market democracy has proved to be much more viable vis-à-vis the administrative command system. Under these circumstances, a completely new formula for the inter-Korean dialogue should be elaborated: Two countries (until the unification) – one system as a vital prerequisite for any kind of progress. Second, Medvedev’s policy towards North Korea seems to be tougher than it was before. Medvedev clearly expressed his vision that “nuclear North Korea is absolutely unacceptable” after the North Korean nuclear test in 2009. The Russian military, on the eve of the North’s missile test, clearly said that they “will do their best in order to protect Russian territory from accidental missile attack”. Last August, Russian chief of staff Gen. Makarov said officially that Russia “deployed antimissile C-400 complex in the Far East in order to prevent North Korean attack”.
The paper deals with two issues: The author’s approach to the Basic Agreement and analysis of Russia – North Korea relations. The author defends two points. First, the central problem in evaluating of the meaning of the Basic Agreement is that the previous conceptual basis for the Agreement – “One country – two systems” – was meaningful only in the Cold War period. The logic behind its existence was provided by the geopolitical rivalry between the USSR and the US. Nowadays the world is totally different as the market democracy has proved to be much more viable vis-à-vis the administrative command system. Under these circumstances, a completely new formula for the inter-Korean dialogue should be elaborated: Two countries (until the unification) – one system as a vital prerequisite for any kind of progress. Second, Medvedev’s policy towards North Korea seems to be tougher than it was before. Medvedev clearly expressed his vision that “nuclear North Korea is absolutely unacceptable” after the North Korean nuclear test in 2009. The Russian military, on the eve of the North’s missile test, clearly said that they “will do their best in order to protect Russian territory from accidental missile attack”. Last August, Russian chief of staff Gen. Makarov said officially that Russia “deployed antimissile C-400 complex in the Far East in order to prevent North Korean attack”.
