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우리나라는 SK글로벌의 대규모 회계분식 사건을 계기로 감사위원회의 전문성을 제고하기 위해 감사위원회내 회계 또는 재무전문가를 두도록 의무화하였다. 그러나 재무전문가에 대한 자질을 규정하지 않고 단지 ‘회계 또는 재무 관련 분야’에서 일정연수 이상의 경력을 가진 자로 정의함으로써 그 범위가 모호하고, 재무전문가에 대한 공시의무도 없어 기업이 재무전문가 의무를 충족하였는지 여부 및 감사위원회 위원 중 누가 재무전문가에 해당하는지를 파악하기가 어렵다. 이로 인해 우리나라에서는 재무전문가 제도가 비효과적으로 운영될 가능성이 있다. 따라서 본 연구에서는 감사위원회 재무전문가 제도의 실효성을 연구한다. 아울러 재무전문가의 효과가 기업지배구조와 관련되어 있는지를 연구한다. 실증분석 결과, 감사위원회내 재무전문가의 존재 자체는 재량적 발생액과 유의한 관련성을 갖지 않는다. 표본을 기업지배구조가 강한 그룹과 약한 그룹으로 구분하여 분석한 결과 기업지배구조가 강한 그룹에서는 재무전문가와 재량적 발생액 사이에 유의한 음의 관계가 나타나는 반면, 기업지배구조가 약한 그룹에서는 재무전문가와 재량적 발생액 사이에 유의한 관련성이 나타나지 않는다. 이러한 결과는 감사위원회 재무전문가가 회계이익의 질을 제고하는 긍정적인 효과는 기업지배구조가 양호하여 재무전문가의 활동을 지원할 수 있을 때만 나타남을 의미한다. 감사위원회 재무전문가는 기업가치와 유의한 관계가 없으며, 기업지배구조가 강한 그룹에서도 유의한 관계를 보이지 않는다. 이는 기업지배구조가 강하면 감사위원회 재무전문가가 회계이익의 질을 높이는 데는 효과적이지만, 이것이 기업가치의 상승으로는 이어지지 않음을 의미한다.
As high-profile accounting scandals including Enron, WorldCom, and Waste Management surfaced in early 2000's, credibility of financial reporting plunged and many voiced the necessity of restoring public confidence in financial reporting. In response to this call, in 2002 the US enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) that is the most radical accounting reform act in the US history. Among others, SOX requires for public companies to disclose whether or not, and if not, the reasons therefor, their audit committee is comprised of at least one member who is a financial expert. In order to fulfill its mandate stipulated in SOX, the US SEC made rules that define a 'financial expert' and require a company to disclose whether it has at least one audit committee financial expert, and if so, the name of the expert and whether the expert is independent of management. In Korea, SK Global accounting scandal erupted in 2003 and the government took an action to enhance credibility of financial reporting and to improve audit quality by amending laws related to corporate governance and external audit. The measures taken by the Korean government are similar to those taken by the US. Pursuant to laws and regulations, Korean listed companies with total assets of more than 2 trillion won must establish audit committees. Furthermore, 2/3 of audit committee members must be independent of management and audit committees must have at least one member who is an accounting or financial expert. However, Korean listed companies are not required to disclose whether they fulfill the legal obligation concerning an accounting or financial expert, and if so, who is the accounting or financial expert. Thus, it is an empirical question whether audit committee financial experts are effective to monitor management in Korea. This study aims to fill this void by examining effectiveness of audit committee financial experts. Specifically, this study examines whether audit committee financial experts reduce earnings management and increase firm value and whether the positive effects of financial experts on earnings quality and firm value are sensitive to the strength of corporate governance of the firm. We measure audit committee financial experts based on the US SEC definition of financial experts and use corporate governance scores issued by Korea Corporate Governance Service as a measure of corporate governance. The results reveal that there is no significant relationship between audit committee financial experts and discretionary accruals. However, financial experts have the significantly negative association with discretionary accruals when corporate governance of the firm is strong. These results suggest that audit committee financial experts are effective in improving quality of financial reports only when corporate governance is strong enough to support oversight of financial experts. Furthermore, we find that audit committee financial experts are not significantly related to firm value and even when corporate governance is strong. These results suggest that although financial experts in conjunction with strong corporate governance improve earnings quality, the improvement in earnings quality does not lead to an increase in firm value. This study provides insights into policy-making concerning audit committee financial experts. Our results suggest that corporate governance of the firm is essential for effectiveness of financial experts.
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Audit committee financial experts, corporate governance, earnings quality, firm value
