본 연구는 론스타펀드Ⅳ의 한국외환은행주식 매각사례를 효과적인 세무계획의 관점에서 분석해서 평가하고, 론스타펀드Ⅳ와 과세관청의 입장에서 채택가능한 대안을 모색하는 것을 목적으로 한다. 구체적으로, 한국외환은행주식 매각사례를 모든 거래 당사자에게 귀속되는 투자자금 및 소득의 흐름에 따라 계약적 관점에서 3가지 전략으로 구분해서 분석했는데, 이 사례에서 론스타펀드Ⅳ는 한-벨기에 조세조약 제13조에 의한 주식양도소득에 대한 거주지국 과세원칙의 적용, 벨기에의 경영참여소득 면제(participation exemption) 혜택의 적용, 벨기에-미국 조세조약에 의한 배당소득에 대한 원천징수의무 면제규정의 적용 및 론스타펀드Ⅳ의 투자자 구성에 따른 면세혜택을 통해 세금을 절감하고자 하였다. 본 연구는 론스타펀드Ⅳ의 한국외환은행주식 매각사례를 소득의 귀속자(귀속지)와 고정사업장의 존재 여부에 따라 론스타펀드Ⅳ가 LSF-KEB홀딩스를 통해 외환은행주식을 매각한 경우(전략1), 론스타펀드Ⅳ가 직접 외환은행주식을 매각한 경우(전략2) 및 론스타펀드Ⅳ가 직접 외환은행주식을 매각했으나 국내에 고정사업장이 존재하는 경우(전략3)로 구분하여 분석하였다. 이 중 론스타펀드Ⅳ는 전략1을 채택하여 소득의 귀속자(귀속지)를 미국의 론스타펀드Ⅳ에서 벨기에의 LSF-KEB홀딩스로 변경한 결과 2007년의 지분매각에서는 최소 1,571억원에서 최대 2,558억원의 세금절감을 시도했고, 2012년 지분매각에서는 최소 4,141억원에서 최대 7,097억원의 세금절감을 시도하였다. 론스타펀드Ⅳ는 거래구조의 계획단계에서 모든 거래당사자에 귀속되는 세금효과를 고려해서 조세부담을 최소화할 수 있게 했고, 국내외의 과세사례와 같이 고정사업장의 논리로 과세하는 것이 현실적으로 어렵기 때문에 진행 중인 소송의 결과에 따른 최종 부담세액의 불확실성이 있지만 소득의 귀속자(귀속지)를 변경하는 세무계획을 통해 상당한 세금을 절감할 것으로 예상할 수 있다. 론스타펀드Ⅳ는 별도의 암묵적 조세도 부담하지 않지만, 복잡한 투자구조로 인한 대리인비용, 기록유지와 계약체결비용, 세무조사비용, 기납부세금으로 인해 상실하는 기회비용 등과 같은 비세금비용을 부담했고, 특히 한국외환은행의 인수시 산업자본의 해당 여부와 인수 후의 대주주 적격성과 관련해서 진행 중인 수년 간의 소송 및 외환카드 주가조작 사건의 유죄판결로 국제적으로도 상당한 평판위험을 부담한 것으로 볼 수 있다. 론스타펀드Ⅳ는 세법적용 가능 여부에 대한 불확실성으로 인한 거래 위험을 부담하고 있고, 최종 부담세액은 소송결과에 따라 결정될 것이다. 소송에서 간주고정사업장에 대한 입증이 불충분해서 법원에서 이를 인정하지 않을 경우에도 론스타펀드Ⅳ의 세무계획은 조세부담의 최소화의 관점에서는 성공적으로 평가하더라도, 다양한 비세금비용과 함께 장기간의 소송으로 출구전략을 원활하게 수행하지 못한 점 등을 고려하면 총비용 최소화의 관점에서는 실패한 측면이 크다고 평가해야 할 것이다. 채택가능했던 대안으로 론스타펀드Ⅳ는 금융기관과의 합작 형태의 투자 또는 유가증권양도소득의 일부를 배당소득으로 변경하는 방법을 고려할 수 있을 것이고, 과세관청은 제2차 납세의무를 통한 납세의무의 확장을 고려할 수 있을 것이다.

The purpose of this case study is analyzing and evaluating the case of Korea Exchange Bank stock sale of Lone Star Fund Ⅳ in view of effective tax planning, and finding practical alternatives which Lone Star Fund Ⅳ and the taxing authorities could take respectively. Considering the flows of investment funds and income, this study constructed three possible strategies for Lone Star Fund Ⅳ, and analyzed the taxes attributed to all parties for each case from the contractual perspective. The analysis of this study shows that the Lone Star Fund Ⅳ tried to reduce the taxes by applying the residence principle in the Korea-Belgium tax treaty into levying on capital gains taxes, the participation exemption in the Belgian tax laws and the exemption of dividend withholding taxes in the Belgium-U.S. tax treaty, and by adjusting investor composition favorably to get tax-exempt preference in the Belgium-U.S. tax treaty. In case of Lone Star Fund Ⅳ, three possible strategy, concerning tax jurisdiction and permanent establishment, are based on the assumption that LSF-KEB Holdings, in lieu of Lone Star Fund Ⅳ, sells stocks of Korea Exchange Bank (Strategy 1), Lone Star Fund Ⅳ itself sells the stocks (Strategy 2), and Lone Star Fund Ⅳ sells the stocks through its permanent establishment in Korea (Strategy 3), respectively. Among them, Lone Star Fund Ⅳ adopted Strategy 1 for abusing forementioned tax laws and tax strategies. That is, Lone Star Fund Ⅳ established a conduit company LSF-KEB Holdings in Belgium and sold the stocks to shift taxable incomes to favorable tax jurisdiction (from U.S. to Belgium). From the contractural perspective, tax planning of Lone Star Fund Ⅳ deems to be successful in that it could save overall tax burdens up to 250 billion Korean Won in 2007 and up to 700 Korean Won in 2011 without bearing implicit taxes. However, because such tax planning creates various and huge non-tax costs, it proves to hardly to be the “effective tax planning”. Non-tax costs of Lone Star Fund Ⅳ include the difficulty in exercising exit plan due to ongoing lawsuits over whether it could fall into industrial capital at the time of purchasing Korea Exchange Bank stocks and whether it could be eligible for a major shareholder during its duration, and due to reputation risk from its lost lawsuit on manipulating Korea Exchange Bank Credit Card Service stock prices. Ongoing lawsuits still impose Lone Star Fund Ⅳ on future transaction risks, and ultimate tax burdens will be up to the results of the lawsuits. In case Lone Star Fund Ⅳ loses the lawsuits, tax planning of Lone Star Fund Ⅳ will be definitely failed one because of inadequately controlled transaction risks and vast non-tax costs. However, even in case Lone Star Fund Ⅳ wins the lawsuits, tax planning of Lone Star Fund Ⅳ will be still regarded as unsuccessful in light of the minimization of total costs. Alternative tax planning of Lone Star Fund Ⅳ could be either (i) investing with other financial institutions to escape controversy over its eligibility for a major shareholder or (ii) converting capital gain to dividend income, whereas the taxing authority could take advantage of the “secondary tax payment obligation” to make tax imposition on Lone Star Fund Ⅳ more guaranteed.

The purpose of this case study is analyzing and evaluating the case of Korea Exchange Bank stock sale of Lone Star Fund Ⅳ in view of effective tax planning, and finding practical alternatives which Lone Star Fund Ⅳ and the taxing authorities could take respectively. Considering the flows of investment funds and income, this study constructed three possible strategies for Lone Star Fund Ⅳ, and analyzed the taxes attributed to all parties for each case from the contractual perspective. The analysis of this study shows that the Lone Star Fund Ⅳ tried to reduce the taxes by applying the residence principle in the Korea-Belgium tax treaty into levying on capital gains taxes, the participation exemption in the Belgian tax laws and the exemption of dividend withholding taxes in the Belgium-U.S. tax treaty, and by adjusting investor composition favorably to get tax-exempt preference in the Belgium-U.S. tax treaty. In case of Lone Star Fund Ⅳ, three possible strategy, concerning tax jurisdiction and permanent establishment, are based on the assumption that LSF-KEB Holdings, in lieu of Lone Star Fund Ⅳ, sells stocks of Korea Exchange Bank (Strategy 1), Lone Star Fund Ⅳ itself sells the stocks (Strategy 2), and Lone Star Fund Ⅳ sells the stocks through its permanent establishment in Korea (Strategy 3), respectively. Among them, Lone Star Fund Ⅳ adopted Strategy 1 for abusing forementioned tax laws and tax strategies. That is, Lone Star Fund Ⅳ established a conduit company LSF-KEB Holdings in Belgium and sold the stocks to shift taxable incomes to favorable tax jurisdiction (from U.S. to Belgium). From the contractural perspective, tax planning of Lone Star Fund Ⅳ deems to be successful in that it could save overall tax burdens up to 250 billion Korean Won in 2007 and up to 700 Korean Won in 2011 without bearing implicit taxes. However, because such tax planning creates various and huge non-tax costs, it proves to hardly to be the “effective tax planning”. Non-tax costs of Lone Star Fund Ⅳ include the difficulty in exercising exit plan due to ongoing lawsuits over whether it could fall into industrial capital at the time of purchasing Korea Exchange Bank stocks and whether it could be eligible for a major shareholder during its duration, and due to reputation risk from its lost lawsuit on manipulating Korea Exchange Bank Credit Card Service stock prices. Ongoing lawsuits still impose Lone Star Fund Ⅳ on future transaction risks, and ultimate tax burdens will be up to the results of the lawsuits. In case Lone Star Fund Ⅳ loses the lawsuits, tax planning of Lone Star Fund Ⅳ will be definitely failed one because of inadequately controlled transaction risks and vast non-tax costs. However, even in case Lone Star Fund Ⅳ wins the lawsuits, tax planning of Lone Star Fund Ⅳ will be still regarded as unsuccessful in light of the minimization of total costs. Alternative tax planning of Lone Star Fund Ⅳ could be either (i) investing with other financial institutions to escape controversy over its eligibility for a major shareholder or (ii) converting capital gain to dividend income, whereas the taxing authority could take advantage of the “secondary tax payment obligation” to make tax imposition on Lone Star Fund Ⅳ more guaranteed.

Effective tax planning, Contractual perspective, Non-tax costs, Transaction risks