초록 열기/닫기 버튼
본 연구는 경영자의 사적 정보가 1분기 유효법인세율 변동을 통해 알려진다고 전제할 때, 이론적으로 제시되고 있는 경영자 사적 정보의 호재여부와 기업의 자발적 공시 간의 관계를 실증적으로 검증하고자 한다. 1분기 유효법인세율 증가가 당기 이익과 유의한 양(+)의 관계가 존재함을 고려할 때 경영자의 당기 이익에 대한 우호적인 예측은 중간 보고기간의 유효법인세율 증가에 반영될 가능성이 높으므로 1분기 유효법인세율 증가 기업일수록 자발적으로 공시할 것으로 기대된다. 본 연구의 분석결과, 1분기 유효법인세율 증가와 자발적 공시 간에 유의한 양(+)의 관계가 관찰되어 이론적 연구와 일관되게 호재일수록 공정공시 중 실적정보의 자발적 공시가 이루어짐을 확인하였다. 또한 news 규모측면에서는 악재의 경우 news 규모가 증가할수록 실적정보의 자발적 공시 가능성이 낮은 것으로 나타났으나, 호재의 경우에는 news 규모가 실적정보의 공시 여부에 유의한 영향을 미치지 않는 것으로 나타났다. 이상의 결과를 종합하면, 1분기 유효법인세율 정보는 당기 이익에 대한 경영자의 기대치를 체계적으로 반영하고 있으므로 사적 정보의 대용치로 유용한 것으로 해석할 수 있으며, news 규모의 자발적 공시에 대한 영향은 호재와 악재가 차별적으로 나타남을 알 수 있다.
This study empirically tests the association between changes in 1st quarter effective tax rate surrogating managers’ favorable private information and voluntary fair disclosure. Several recent studies suggest that 1st quarter effective tax rate signals managers’ naive expectation by showing that increase in 1st quarter effective tax rate is positively related to the increase in net income of current fiscal year. Based on this, the study hypothesizes that changes in 1st quarter effective tax rate may include properties about managers’ favorable private information and tests the association with managers’ voluntary disclosure behavior. Using changes in 1st quarter effective tax rate as a proxy for private information has several advantage as followings. First, it may reflect managerial forecast information in the ex-ante sense. Second, it can be more generalized proxy because all firms are required to mandatorily include 1st quarter effective tax rate information in business report thus financial information users may easily access while changes in dividends or managerial forecast information are limitedly avaliable for firms which actually have distributed dividends or disclosed managerial forecasts. As mentioned above, the study assumes that increase in 1st quarter effective tax rate greater from prior year surrogates favorable private information. To clearly document results of tests, the study divides sample into two part; systematic information group where 1st quarter effective tax rate is greater than effective tax rate of current year and unsystematic information group where earnings management using effective tax rate is likely to occur. If hypothesis is supported, the association between increases in 1st quarter effective tax rate and voluntary disclosure will be statistically significant only in systematic information group. Sample composition of the study is 3,768 non-financial firm-year observations which are listed in Korean Stock Exchange(KSE) or Korean Securities Dealers Automated(KOSDAQ) from 2003 to 2010. Sub-sample to test voluntary disclosure by information properties includes systematic information group and unsystematic information group whether 1st quarter effective tax rate is greater than annual effective tax rate. Followings are findings of the study. First, the study shows the positive relation between increase in 1st quarter effective tax rate and good news. Specifically, results indicates that managers’ voluntary disclosure exist in firms with systematic private information in 1st quarter effective tax rate. This result supports theoretical studies showing that managers having favorable private information are likely to disclose their information voluntarily and demonstrates that 1st quarter effective tax rate information systematically reflects managerial private information only when effective tax rate is not used to manage earnings. Second, the study also finds that managers are less likely to disclose quantitative information as impact of bad news increases, indicating that managers consider investors’ response when they voluntarily disclose their private information. Taken together, the study’s findings reinforce the notion that 1st quarter effective tax rate systematically reflect managers’ favorable private information and distinctive relation exists by the types of news managers render to the capital market.
키워드열기/닫기 버튼
1st quarter effective tax rate, voluntary fair disclosure, systematic information
