본 연구는 설문조사를 통해 2013년도 사업연도부터 시행된 개인별 임원 보수 공시제도와 관련한 사회구성원들의 인식을 탐색하고, 조건부 가치측정법(Contingent Valuation Method)을 통해 현재 시행되고 있는 임원 개인별 보수 공시 제도와 보수 공개대상 확대 안에 대해 정보이용자로서의 사회구성원들이 부여하고 있는 가치를 추정한다. 총 388명의 성인을 대상으로 한 설문 결과, 응답자의 상당수가 임원 개인별 보수 공시 제도의 필요성과 유용성에 긍정적인 응답을 보였으나, 현재 제도상의 보수 공개범위가 불충분하다고 응답했다. 또한 보상 정보와 관련하여, 국내 경영자가 성과에 비해 많이 받는 편이지만, 미국의 경영자에 비해서는 성과 대비 낮은 수준의 보상을 받는다고 응답했다. 사회구성원들이 임원의 개인별 보수 정보 공시 제도에 부여하고 있는 경제적 가치를 추정하기 위해 조건부 가치측정법 중 이중양분선택법을 이용하여 지불의사를 유도한 결과, 임원의 개인별 보수 정보 공시 제도에 대한 1인당 연간 지불의사금액(Willingness To Pay)은 6,637원으로 추정되어, 정보를 제공받는 이용자의 입장으로서의 사회구성원들이 임원의 개인별 보수 공시 제도에 대해 상당한 가치를 부여하고 있는 것으로 나타났다. 또한, 보수 공개대상 확대 개정안에 대해서는 1인당 연간 6,501원의 지불의사금액이 추정되었는데, 이는 사회구성원들이 공개대상 확대 안에 대해 현재의 보수 공개 제도와 유사한 수준의 가치를 부여하고 있음을 나타내며 이용자 입장에서 현재 공개되지 않은 미등기 임원의 보수 정보 역시 중요한 정보로 인식하고 있음을 의미한다. 본 연구는 수요측면의 정보이용자의 입장에서 사회구성원들의 임원 보수에 대한 사회적 인식을 조사함으로써 임원 보수와 관련된 기존의 연구를 확장한다. 또한, 현재 시행중인 개별임원보수 공시 제도에 대한 경제적 가치를 추정함으로써 사회구성원들이 인식하는 공시제도의 중요성에 대한 직접적인 근거를 제공하고, 보수 정보 공개 범위 확대 안의 가치 또한 추정, 비교함으로써 현재 진행되고 있는 논의들에 대한 시사점을 제공한다.

The purpose of this study is to investigate public perceptions of individual executives’ annual pay information disclosed by new regulations, to estimate the economic value of the disclosed pay information through individuals’ willingness to pay (WTP), and to estimate the value of additional pay information caused by extending the range of disclosure. We examine these issues using the contingent valuation methods (CVM) from survey response data. Since the 2013 amendment of the financial investment services and capital market act, Korean listed firms should have begun to disclose extended information about executive compensation, including individual executives’ annual pay information, to the public. This specific pay information regarding board members should be disclosed if the company had paid their executives more than 500 million won per person. According to this new regulation, a lively related discussion has been achieved; pros and cons, usefulness of this new disclosed information, limitations, and an improvement plan for this new regulation. Although this disclosure has attracted large attention from mass media and the public, there is little evidence as to how members of society perceive the newly disclosed CEO pay information in either a positive or negative way, how the public values this information as useful. We attempt to analyze the public’s perceptions of the individual executives’ annual pay information disclosed by the new regulation and assess the awareness of society about the executive pay disclosure using survey responses from 388 adults who are at least 20 years of age. In the second part of this paper, we investigate the economic value of the newly disclosed information about executives by estimating individuals’ willingness to pay (WTP) for the compensation information, using a contingent valuation methods (CVM). We find that 83 percent of respondents agree with the need for new information about executive compensation, but 66 percent of them responded that current disclosure rules about executive compensation are not enough and that further disclosure is needed. This result is consistent with the concerns about the regulation that some executives could avoid providing their payment information to the public by changing their condition from registered to unregistered. In the results related to the pros and cons of the new disclosure, respondents select enhancing business transparency (62.9%), strengthening supervision of the management (52.6%), strengthening links between pay and performance (38.4%) and meeting the right to know (26.5%) as positive aspects. As for negative aspects, respondents select promoting public opinion in negative way (36.9%), manager’s evasion of duties (36.1%), barrier for establishing professional CEO system (28.4%), and promoting disharmony in the firm (25.0%). We also find that members of society perceive that Korean executives receive larger compensation compared to their performance in general, however, not large compared to the amount that executives in the U.S. are paid. Second, we investigate how the public values the rule and information using contingent valuation methods (CVM) by estimating willingness to pay (WTP) for the compensation information in current (Part A) and for extending the disclosure target range (Part B). The results suggest that a median value of estimated WTP is 6,637 Korean won for Part A and 6,501 for Part B, respectively. These estimated WTPs imply that the public regards compensation information as valuable, and they perceive the unreleased pay information of the non-registered executives’ to be as important as the current disclosed information. Finally, we examine the difference of estimated WTP among the groups by respondents’ characteristics. The results suggest that a group having high values on the usefulness of the individual executive pay disclosure, having high preference degree for the CEO and non-investors reveals more willingness to pay for the pay disclosure information and extending the target range of the rule. Our study contributes to the literature on executive compensation by providing evidence that compensation information is useful and valuable in a perspective of extensive information users such as the public. We also propose an economic value of those information by estimating WTP for compensation information.

Executive compensation disclosure, Compensation information, Contingent valuation method