중국 국유기업개혁이 분권화 개혁정책에 따라 진행되었기 때문에 기업통제권이 기업소유자인 정부로부터 기업내부자인 경영자에게 점진적으로 이전되었고, 기업지배구조도 정부중심의 기업지배구조에서 내부자 중심의 기업지배구조로 변화되었다. 이런 과정 중에 내부자통제현상이 심화되었다. 내부자통제는 경영자 (기업내부자)가 자신이 가진 기업통제권을 이용하여 소유자(기업외부자) 권익을 침해하게 되는데, 중국의 경우에는 내부자통제의 진전과 더불어 대량의 국유자산의 유실이 발생하였다. 이 때문에 내부자통제현상은 중국 국유기업지배구조의 핵심문제가 되었다.국유기업집단 모회사의 지주화는 국유기업의 내부자통제문제를 극복하는 일환으로 진행되었다. 즉 국유기업집단 모회사의 지주화를 통해 기층 국유기업에 대한 감독과 통제를 강화함으로써 내부자통제와 국유자산 유실을 해소하고자 하였다. 그러나 국유기업집단의 지주화는 기층 국유기업의 내부자통제를 해소하지 못했을 뿐만 아니라, 국유지주회사에 대한 감독과 유인기제의 부재로 국유지주회사 자체의 내부자통제를 초래하여 국유기업집단 내부자통제의 딜레마에 빠지게 되었다. 따라서 어떻게 국유기업집단 내부자통제의 딜레마를 극복할 것인가, 즉 어떻게 국유지주회사를 제대로 규제하여 국유자산을 보전·증식할 것인가는 국유기업집단지배의 핵심문제가 되었다.

Because China's SOEs (state-owned enterprises) reform is progressed according to decentralization, the corporate control rights has gradually transferred from the government as a owner of the corporate, to a manager as the insider of the corporate. And corporate governance has also been changed from the government control system to the insider control system. During this process, insider control phenomenon has been spread over. Through the insider control, a manager (the insider of the corporate) gets to invade rights and interests of the owner (the outsider of the corporate) by using his corporate control rights, and in the case of China, the progress of the insider control lead to massive loss of state-owned assets. Because of it, the insider control phenomenon has became the core issues of SOEs` corporate governance in China. Mother enterprise of state-owned business group into stock holding companies was progressed as means of overcoming the insider control problem. Namely, through mother enterprise of state-owned business group into stock holding companies, China tried to strengthen supervising and controlling on existing state-owned companies, and tried to solve the insider control and the loss of state-owned assets. But, it could not only solve the insider control of an existing SOEs, but it also caused the insider control on state-owned holding companies itself through absence of supervision and incentive mechanism on state-owned holding companies, thus China falls into "the dilemma of the insider control" on state-owned business group. Therefore, how to overcome the dilemma of the insider control on state-owned business group, ie, how to preserves and increases state-owned assets through rightly regulating state-owned holding company became the core issues of State-owned business group’s corporate governance.

Because China's SOEs (state-owned enterprises) reform is progressed according to decentralization, the corporate control rights has gradually transferred from the government as a owner of the corporate, to a manager as the insider of the corporate. And corporate governance has also been changed from the government control system to the insider control system. During this process, insider control phenomenon has been spread over. Through the insider control, a manager (the insider of the corporate) gets to invade rights and interests of the owner (the outsider of the corporate) by using his corporate control rights, and in the case of China, the progress of the insider control lead to massive loss of state-owned assets. Because of it, the insider control phenomenon has became the core issues of SOEs` corporate governance in China. Mother enterprise of state-owned business group into stock holding companies was progressed as means of overcoming the insider control problem. Namely, through mother enterprise of state-owned business group into stock holding companies, China tried to strengthen supervising and controlling on existing state-owned companies, and tried to solve the insider control and the loss of state-owned assets. But, it could not only solve the insider control of an existing SOEs, but it also caused the insider control on state-owned holding companies itself through absence of supervision and incentive mechanism on state-owned holding companies, thus China falls into "the dilemma of the insider control" on state-owned business group. Therefore, how to overcome the dilemma of the insider control on state-owned business group, ie, how to preserves and increases state-owned assets through rightly regulating state-owned holding company became the core issues of State-owned business group’s corporate governance.

business group, state-owned holding company, corporate governance, insider control, the loss of state-owned assets