본 연구는 1986년 1월 1일부터 2007년 12월 31일까지 한국거래소의 유가증권시장에 상장된 기업을 대상으로 재무적자와 재무흑자가 자본구조에 미치는 비대칭적 영향을 실증분석 하였으며, 주요한 분석결과는 다음과 같다. 기업의 실제 레버리지가 목표 레버리지를 상방향으로 이탈하거나 하방향으로 이탈하느냐에 따라 레버리지 조정에 비대칭적으로 영향을 미친다. 실제 레버리지가 목표 레버리지를 상방향으로 이탈하면 부채상환을 통해 레버리지를 감소시키고, 하방향으로 이탈하면 부채조달을 통해 레버리지를 증가시킨다. 그리고 기업이 재무흑자를 달성하느냐 재무적자를 달성하느냐에 따라 레버리지 조정에 비대칭적으로 영향을 미친다. 기업이 재무흑자를 달성하면 부채상환을 통해 레버리지를 감소시키고, 재무적자를 달성하면 부채조달을 통해 레버리지를 증가시킨다. 실제 레버리지가 목표 레버리지를 상방향으로 이탈한 상태에서, 재무흑자가 발생하면 재무적자가 발생할 때보다 레버리지가 더 크게 감소한다. 그리고 실제 레버리지가 목표 레버리지를 하방향으로 이탈한 상태에서, 재무적자가 발생하면 재무흑자가 발생할 때보다 레버리지가 더 크게 증가한다. 따라서 실제 레버리지가 목표 레버리지를 상방향으로 이탈한 상태에서, 재무흑자가 발생하면 재무적자가 발생할 때보다 레버리지 조정속도가 더 빠르다. 그리고 실제 레버리지가 목표 레버리지를 하방향으로 이탈한 상태에서, 재무적자가 발생하면 재무흑자가 발생할 때보다 레버리지 조정속도가 더 빠르다. 결론적으로, 기업의 실제 레버리지가 목표 레버리지를 상방향으로 이탈하느냐 하방향으로 이탈하느냐, 그리고 그러한 상황에서 재무흑자가 발생하느냐 재무적자가 발생하느냐에 따라 자본구조 조정속도가 달라진다고 할 수 있다. 따라서 기업 경영자들은 레버리지의 상방향 또는 하방향 이탈 여부와 재무적자 또는 재무흑자 여부를 비대칭적으로 고려하여 자본구조를 조정함으로써 기업가치를 극대화시킬 수 있다고 생각한다.

In this paper, we study empirically the asymmetric effects between financial deficits and financial surpluses on capital structure adjustment of firms listed on Korea Securities Market. we find that most adjustment occur when firms have above-target leverage with a financial surpluses or when they have below-target leverage with a financial deficits. These results suggest that firms move likely toward the target leverage when they face financial deficits or financial surpluses. We also examine firms' propensities to use financial deficits or financial surpluses to capital structure adjustment conditional on above-target leverage and below-target leverage. We find that firms with above-target leverage use all of their financial surpluses to pay off debt, whereas firms with below-target leverage retire both debt and equity with their financial surpluses. Firms appear to preserve their debt capacity for future financing needs in order to avoid the higher costs of repurchasing and reissuing equity. Further, we find that firms finance their financial deficits with more debt when they have below-target leverage than when they have above-target leverage. Controlling for the disparity between the deviation from the target leverage and the financial deficits or financial surpluses, we find that the changes in capital structure are consistent with the target leverage adjustment model. Conclusively, adverse selection costs with asymmetric information influence firms' capital structure adjustment, but this evidence is not consistent with traditional pecking order theory. Thus, adverse selection costs, along with other costs and benefits of capital structure, must be recognized a part of unified theory of capital structure.

In this paper, we study empirically the asymmetric effects between financial deficits and financial surpluses on capital structure adjustment of firms listed on Korea Securities Market. we find that most adjustment occur when firms have above-target leverage with a financial surpluses or when they have below-target leverage with a financial deficits. These results suggest that firms move likely toward the target leverage when they face financial deficits or financial surpluses. We also examine firms' propensities to use financial deficits or financial surpluses to capital structure adjustment conditional on above-target leverage and below-target leverage. We find that firms with above-target leverage use all of their financial surpluses to pay off debt, whereas firms with below-target leverage retire both debt and equity with their financial surpluses. Firms appear to preserve their debt capacity for future financing needs in order to avoid the higher costs of repurchasing and reissuing equity. Further, we find that firms finance their financial deficits with more debt when they have below-target leverage than when they have above-target leverage. Controlling for the disparity between the deviation from the target leverage and the financial deficits or financial surpluses, we find that the changes in capital structure are consistent with the target leverage adjustment model. Conclusively, adverse selection costs with asymmetric information influence firms' capital structure adjustment, but this evidence is not consistent with traditional pecking order theory. Thus, adverse selection costs, along with other costs and benefits of capital structure, must be recognized a part of unified theory of capital structure.

Financial Deficit, Financial Surplus, Capital Structure, Target Leverage Capital Structure Adjustment Speed.