While precedent researches on the impact or results of the First Oil Crisis are numerous, those on the cause are rare. It may be because the phenomenon of 1973 oil crisis includes extreme complexities. Though this phenomenon must be analyzed from the Fourth Middle East War to international oil system, precedent researches was partially involved in separate spheres. This study is the trial of overcoming this limits. I tried to explain the cause of the First Oil Crisis comprehensively with the results of U.S. foreign policy toward Middle East. The structural change of international oil industry has resulted in irreversible quadrupled price, and the decision of oil weaponization, the Fourth Middle East War and embargo-production cut of oil, had catalyzed this outcome. I tried to suggest this framework of these three factors, oil weaponization, the structural change of international oil industry, and irreversible quadrupled price as a definition of the First Oil Crisis. U.S. split-policies toward Middle East made direct and indirect influences on these three factors. First, the decision of oil weaponization can be analyzed in the two parts. On the Fourth Middle East War, the political portfolio of Nixon bore the failure of Rogers Plan and the flop of winning Egypt over to U.S. side. On the embargo-production cut of oil, U.S. ignored the warning of King Faisal on the embargo and production cut of oil due to split status in policy-making, and the ignorance made stable backgrounds for initiating the war. Second, the sphere on the structural change of international oil industry can be explained through U.S. split-policies toward major oil companies. In one side, U.S. government supported major oil companies temporarily for the other purpose, indirect aid to oil-exporting countries, and in the other side, she offered the competitive circumstances with independent oil companies in terms of quota system, and at the end major oil companies was made satisfied in stable domestic market. The other dilemma of major oil companies was the schizo-tendency of the other branches of governments, Department of State and Judicial branch. While the former required national strategical cooperations to major oil companies, the latter shook the basis of the adjustmental power of major oil companies through antitrust law. As a result, no one could expect the public function―domestically and internationally―on major oil companies, and at last companies could not but being at a loss before negotiating tables with oil-exporting countries enriched by indirect revenue aid of U.S. government. On the other hand, the oil import quota system of U.S. influenced the market of supply and demand, so that it aggravated the decline of domestic production and the abrupt increase of demand. Finally, the Economic Stabilization Programme which pursued both price control and production increase, at last, drove the international oil market more overheated, so that it exaggerated the impact of oil crisis by precedent changes.

While precedent researches on the impact or results of the First Oil Crisis are numerous, those on the cause are rare. It may be because the phenomenon of 1973 oil crisis includes extreme complexities. Though this phenomenon must be analyzed from the Fourth Middle East War to international oil system, precedent researches was partially involved in separate spheres. This study is the trial of overcoming this limits. I tried to explain the cause of the First Oil Crisis comprehensively with the results of U.S. foreign policy toward Middle East. The structural change of international oil industry has resulted in irreversible quadrupled price, and the decision of oil weaponization, the Fourth Middle East War and embargo-production cut of oil, had catalyzed this outcome. I tried to suggest this framework of these three factors, oil weaponization, the structural change of international oil industry, and irreversible quadrupled price as a definition of the First Oil Crisis. U.S. split-policies toward Middle East made direct and indirect influences on these three factors. First, the decision of oil weaponization can be analyzed in the two parts. On the Fourth Middle East War, the political portfolio of Nixon bore the failure of Rogers Plan and the flop of winning Egypt over to U.S. side. On the embargo-production cut of oil, U.S. ignored the warning of King Faisal on the embargo and production cut of oil due to split status in policy-making, and the ignorance made stable backgrounds for initiating the war. Second, the sphere on the structural change of international oil industry can be explained through U.S. split-policies toward major oil companies. In one side, U.S. government supported major oil companies temporarily for the other purpose, indirect aid to oil-exporting countries, and in the other side, she offered the competitive circumstances with independent oil companies in terms of quota system, and at the end major oil companies was made satisfied in stable domestic market. The other dilemma of major oil companies was the schizo-tendency of the other branches of governments, Department of State and Judicial branch. While the former required national strategical cooperations to major oil companies, the latter shook the basis of the adjustmental power of major oil companies through antitrust law. As a result, no one could expect the public function―domestically and internationally―on major oil companies, and at last companies could not but being at a loss before negotiating tables with oil-exporting countries enriched by indirect revenue aid of U.S. government. On the other hand, the oil import quota system of U.S. influenced the market of supply and demand, so that it aggravated the decline of domestic production and the abrupt increase of demand. Finally, the Economic Stabilization Programme which pursued both price control and production increase, at last, drove the international oil market more overheated, so that it exaggerated the impact of oil crisis by precedent changes.

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U.S. Foreign Policies toward Middle East, the First Oil Crisis, Oil Price, Oil Weaponization, Middle East War, Arab-Israeli, International Oil Industry, Major Oil Companies, Energy Policy, Domestic Structure of Foreign Policy