초록 열기/닫기 버튼

17세기 중반의 잉글랜드와 유럽을 이야기하면서 전자의 헤게모니를 언급한다는 것은 시기상조이다. 그러나 헤게모니를 이야기하지 못한다고 해서 잉글랜드의 영향력 있는 외교활동을 언급할 수 없다는 것은 아니다. 크롬웰이 외교정책을 수립하면서 핵심적으로 고려했던 사항은 퓨리턴 정체성에 입각한 유럽대륙에서의 개신교의 입지 강화와 자신의 정권안전이었다. 여기에 잉글랜드의 무역활동을 보호하는 것도 중요했다. 크롬웰의 주요 외교무대는 크게 3개 지역, 네덜란드 지역, 발트 지역, 그리고 프랑스와 에스파냐 지역으로 나뉘어져 있었다. 첫 2개의 지역과는 달리 스튜어트 정부를 후원했던 에스파냐와 프랑스는 크롬웰 정부에게 계속 위협적인 존재로 남아있었다. 크롬웰이 이 두 나라와 어떻게 외교정책을 펼쳐나갔으며 이것이 잉글랜드의 국익에 어떠한 영향을 미쳤는가에 대해서는 역사가들의 의견이 크게 엇갈린다. 부정적인 견해를 보이는 역사가들은 주로 경제적, 전략적 측면을 강조하며 크롬웰의 외교정책을 비판하고 있는 반면, 긍정적인 평가는 주로 종교적 이념과 경제적 요구 및 국내 상황을 그 상호관계 속에서 고려하고 있다. 본고에서는 이러한 상이한 견해들을 여러 측면에서 살펴봄으로써 필자 나름의 평가를 내려 보고자 한다.


To talk about hegemony when addressing the subject of England’s relationship with Europe in mid seventeenth century is certainly premature. One of the primary reasons for this is because England only came to dominate the European scene politically in latter 18th century. Prior to it, Spain occupied the center stage in the European diplomacy during the 16th and 17th centuries, and France in the 17th and 18th centuries. However, an absence of hegemony does not necessarily imply that historians cannot speak of influential foreign policy and diplomatic activity. Although Oliver Cromwell was at the helm of government for only a brief period of five years, his government was able to intervene efficiently in the affairs of the European continent, much more so than their predecessors, especially by using their powerfully built up navy as an effective lever. Further, such an interventionist policy threw the spotlight on England during this time. In developing its foreign policy, the Cromwellian government took into primary consideration its own puritan identity and the concomitant aspiration to create a pan European alliance of Protestants, the consolidation of the newly formed government, and the strengthening and expansion of England’s commercial interests. The main regions with which the government engaged in active diplomacy were the Netherlands, the Baltic region, and France and Spain. Unlike the first two, France and Spain continued to present a threat to Cromwellian government’s security after 1654 because they recognized and supported Charles II’s claim to the throne of England. Thus, the Protectorate found itself preoccupied with keeping in check these powers or even weakening their position. Historians differ, and markedly at times, in their assessment of Cromwell’s diplomatic engagement with the two countries and the impact it had on England’s national interests. Broadly speaking, such assessments tend to be either positive or negative. Historians who do not think too highly of Cromwell’s foreign policy generally focus on its economic and strategic aspects, while scholars who are complimentary of the policy tend to provide a more inclusive consideration of religious beliefs, economic demands, and domestic needs. In this article, I examine the varying assessments given by historians of the Cromwellian Protectorate’s foreign policy and offer my own criticism and assessment.