초록 열기/닫기 버튼

본 논문은 한․미 자유무역협정을 둘러싼 법적 문제를 해결하는 데 있어서 11세기에서 19세기까지 영국 법체계의 역사적 발달이 주는 교훈이오늘날 한국의 법적 문제를 해결하는데 의미 있는 시사점을 제공할 수있다는 점을 보여 주고자 한다. 15세기경에 영국에서는 권리구제의 측면에서 효율적인 형평법 법원이 더 많은 소송인을 끌어 들이게 되면서 형평법은 보통법에 대등할 정도로 빠르게 발전하였다. 이러한 분석은 오늘날 많은 논란을 야기하고 있는 투자자-국가 중재판정부와 국내 법원의 관계에도 적용될 수 있다. 현재 투자자-국가 중재제도가 고비용․저효율의구조를 가지고 있다는 점을 고려해 볼 때, 국내 법원의 장점인 신속성과집행력을 확보해 낼 수 있다면 외국 투자자들이 국내 법원을 선호 할 것이다.


This research attempts to show that the historical lessons of theEnglish legal system can provide fruitful insights into theKORUS-FTA. The plaintiff could have chosen one of two Courts―namely, the Common Law Court and the Equity Court―until the 19century because the jurisdictions of the two Courts overlapped. However, the legal remedy from the Equity Court was moreefficient and effective, so more claimants preferred this Court to theCommon Law Court. The successful development of the EquityCourt and the Equity Law encouraged the judges of the CommonLaw Court to provide more flexible and efficient legal remedies forthe plaintiffs. The analysis of the historical development of therelationship between the Common Law and the Equity can beapplicable to the dynamic relations between the national court andinternational investment arbitration. In Korea, the investor-statearbitration system has been controversial since the establishment ofthe Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement. A group of national courtjudges and civic groups have expressed concerns that theestablishment of investment arbitration could collide with theconstitutional principle of “judicial sovereignty,” which means thatthe constitution only allows national courts to retain the exclusiveand ultimate authority to settle legal disputes within their nationalboundaries. Contrary to such criticism, this research attempts tocorroborate that investment arbitration and the national court can co-exist under the national constitutional framework. Under thecurrent settings of KORUS-FTA, foreign investors are allowed tochoose between a national and an international remedy ininvestment disputes. As such, this situation can encourage the twoinstitutions to compete in their provision of more reliable andacceptable rulings in order to attract more actors. Foreign investorsare likely to choose the national remedy more frequently if thenational courts outperform investment arbitration in the settling ofdisputes. Investor preference could enhance the possibility of makingthe national system appear more reliable and reputational to therelevant actors.