Throughout the past year and up to the most recent weeks, North Korea’s posture toward the outside world had deteriorated in the direction of extravagant toughness and drastic provocation. It seems that Pyongyang has begun a top leader succession process which is most important to the DPRK and its regime but for which they are severely under-prepared. The requirements relating to it have determined North Korea’s recent behavior. At the same time, Pyongyang also strives to force other major concerned parties to accept its nuclear armed status. For years China has insisted on the principle of the denuclearization of North Korea. However, like other main concerned parties, the record of China’s performance on the North Korea nuclear problem has had many frustrations and failures. There is a perennial strategic paradox for China: the need to balance opposing imperatives and deal with them by less efficient half-measures. China should alter its too lenient policy toward Pyongyang’s behavior, attaching to continued assistance resolute political preconditions. As to the military impact of North Korea’s WMD program, the Pyongyang regime has become more uncontrollable in its military dynamism, though the severe financial shortage imposed by the sanctions and the economic plight are damaging its WMD program. In the face of its provocation, the dramatic strengthening of the American strategic alliance with the ROK and Japan has become one of the remarkable features of U.S. policy under President Obama; the alliance with the ROK has profited the most. Also as a direct response, the U.S. has enhanced its military presence in the region. At the same time, unprecedented resounding voices of going nuclear and developing strategic missiles have suddenly been heard in the ROK and similar appeals are being heard again in Japan. All these developments, combined with Pyongyang’s behavior, have made objectively the overall strategic situation changing in a direction disadvantageous to China, while there is “indirect approach” for pressuring China to be harder toward Pyongyang that seems to constitute part of the subjective intention of the counter-measures on the part of U.S. and its allies. In the case of North Korean problem, military balance is a particularly dynamic thing. The measures or countermeasures in the circle are ominous to China’s overall security interests. Hence, China has vital interests in doing more for removing Pyongyang’s WMD program. As to the required common response, the present cardinal task is to implement seriously U.N. Security Council Resolution 1874. The lesson of the dissipation in the past of implementing Security Council Resolution 1718 should be remembered firmly. The United States and its allies should understand empathically China’s overall legitimate interests as well as its worries and complications, while pushing appropriately for its additional actions. There should also be closer strategic communication with China on military counter-measures in order to remove strategic suspicion. Finally, there seems to be an increasing need for joint “strategic planning” with China on the very sensitive issue of how to deal with the possible severe instability of the Pyongyang regime.

Throughout the past year and up to the most recent weeks, North Korea’s posture toward the outside world had deteriorated in the direction of extravagant toughness and drastic provocation. It seems that Pyongyang has begun a top leader succession process which is most important to the DPRK and its regime but for which they are severely under-prepared. The requirements relating to it have determined North Korea’s recent behavior. At the same time, Pyongyang also strives to force other major concerned parties to accept its nuclear armed status. For years China has insisted on the principle of the denuclearization of North Korea. However, like other main concerned parties, the record of China’s performance on the North Korea nuclear problem has had many frustrations and failures. There is a perennial strategic paradox for China: the need to balance opposing imperatives and deal with them by less efficient half-measures. China should alter its too lenient policy toward Pyongyang’s behavior, attaching to continued assistance resolute political preconditions. As to the military impact of North Korea’s WMD program, the Pyongyang regime has become more uncontrollable in its military dynamism, though the severe financial shortage imposed by the sanctions and the economic plight are damaging its WMD program. In the face of its provocation, the dramatic strengthening of the American strategic alliance with the ROK and Japan has become one of the remarkable features of U.S. policy under President Obama; the alliance with the ROK has profited the most. Also as a direct response, the U.S. has enhanced its military presence in the region. At the same time, unprecedented resounding voices of going nuclear and developing strategic missiles have suddenly been heard in the ROK and similar appeals are being heard again in Japan. All these developments, combined with Pyongyang’s behavior, have made objectively the overall strategic situation changing in a direction disadvantageous to China, while there is “indirect approach” for pressuring China to be harder toward Pyongyang that seems to constitute part of the subjective intention of the counter-measures on the part of U.S. and its allies. In the case of North Korean problem, military balance is a particularly dynamic thing. The measures or countermeasures in the circle are ominous to China’s overall security interests. Hence, China has vital interests in doing more for removing Pyongyang’s WMD program. As to the required common response, the present cardinal task is to implement seriously U.N. Security Council Resolution 1874. The lesson of the dissipation in the past of implementing Security Council Resolution 1718 should be remembered firmly. The United States and its allies should understand empathically China’s overall legitimate interests as well as its worries and complications, while pushing appropriately for its additional actions. There should also be closer strategic communication with China on military counter-measures in order to remove strategic suspicion. Finally, there seems to be an increasing need for joint “strategic planning” with China on the very sensitive issue of how to deal with the possible severe instability of the Pyongyang regime.