양심 및 양심의 가책에 대한 니체의 숙고는 도덕의 계보 두 번째 글에 집약되어 있으며, 그 숙고에 니체 자신이 ‘양심의 심리학’이라는 이름을 붙인다. 본 논문은 두 가지 목적을 가지고 있다. 첫째, 가설적이면서도 산발적 형태를 지닌 양심의 심리학을 부채 이론, 내면화 이론 그리고 약속 이론의 형태로 체계화시켜, 양심과 양심의 가책의 상이한 계보를 추적한다. 둘째, 양심의 심리학을 도덕이론이 아니라 인간학 이론으로 제시한다. 양심의 심리학이 제공하는 양심 및 양심의 가책의 계보는 다음과 같다. 양심의 가책은 ‘병든 원한 인간’이 경제적 계약관계를 맺으면서 그리고 공동체 결성 및 사회화 과정을 거치면서 발생한다. 반면 양심은 약속권리를 갖는 ‘건강한 주권적 개인’의 책임의식이자 자유의식이다. 이 내용은 ‘양심의 심리학’을 형벌이론, 국가 및 사회이론, 정의론의 연관으로 포함시키는 해석이나 혹은 단순히 도덕철학의 범주로 형식적으로 포함시키는 해석들과는 달리, 인간학으로 고찰할 수 있다는 주장을 가능하게 한다. 그 이론들이 인간에 대한 새로운 규정을, 즉 약속 가능한 동물(animal promissible)로서의 인간이라는 규정을 제시하고, 약속과 책임과 양심을 인간의 조건으로 설정하며, ‘주권적 개인-원한 인간’이라는 새로운 형태의 인간 유형론을 제공하기 때문이다. 또한 주권적 개인에게만 가책에서 자유로운 양심을 귀속시키면서, 주권적 개인이 되는 것을 인간 삶의 과제이자 인간 삶의 이상으로 설정하고 있기 때문이다.

This paper has two goals. First, it traces the different genealogies of conscience and bad conscience by systematizing Nietzsche's 'psychology of conscience,' which is hypothetical and scattered, into the forms of debt theory, internalization theory, and promise theory. Second, the psychology of conscience is presented as philosophical anthropology beyond mere moral theory. The psychology of conscience presents the genealogies of conscience and bad conscience as follows. Bad conscience grows as the 'sick man of ressentiment' makes economic contractual relationships, forms communities, and goes through socialization. On the other hand, conscience is both the consciousness of responsibility and freedom of 'sovereign individual' who has the right to make promises. This exposition makes it possible to argue that the psychology of conscience should be firstly considered as philosophical anthropology in a different way from the interpretations which include it either in what is associated with theories of punishment, nation, society, and justice or simply in the category of moral philosophy. Indeed, Nietzsche's contemplation stipulates human being as an animal promissible, sets making promises, responsibility, and conscience as conditio humana, and provides a new theory of humankind, in terms of 'sovereign individual-man of ressentiment. Moreover, with imputing conscience free from qualms only to sovereign individual, he establishes being sovereign individual as both a task and an ideal of human life.

This paper has two goals. First, it traces the different genealogies of conscience and bad conscience by systematizing Nietzsche's 'psychology of conscience,' which is hypothetical and scattered, into the forms of debt theory, internalization theory, and promise theory. Second, the psychology of conscience is presented as philosophical anthropology beyond mere moral theory. The psychology of conscience presents the genealogies of conscience and bad conscience as follows. Bad conscience grows as the 'sick man of ressentiment' makes economic contractual relationships, forms communities, and goes through socialization. On the other hand, conscience is both the consciousness of responsibility and freedom of 'sovereign individual' who has the right to make promises. This exposition makes it possible to argue that the psychology of conscience should be firstly considered as philosophical anthropology in a different way from the interpretations which include it either in what is associated with theories of punishment, nation, society, and justice or simply in the category of moral philosophy. Indeed, Nietzsche's contemplation stipulates human being as an animal promissible, sets making promises, responsibility, and conscience as conditio humana, and provides a new theory of humankind, in terms of 'sovereign individual-man of ressentiment. Moreover, with imputing conscience free from qualms only to sovereign individual, he establishes being sovereign individual as both a task and an ideal of human life.

Nietzsche, Conscience, Bad Conscience, Debt Theory, Internalization Theory, Promise Theory