자기주식 취득에 대하여 최근 경영자기회주의 가설이 주목받고 있다. 또한, 경영자들의 대리인 문제 해결방안으로 사외이사제도가 활용되고 있으며, 사외이사의 역할에 대한 선행연구들은 서로 상반된 결과들을 제시하고 있다. 따라서 본 연구는 자기주식취득 의사결정 과정에서 경영자들의 기회주의적 행동에 대한 사외이사의 역할에 대하여 실증적으로 분석한다. 본 연구는 자기주식 취득과 사외이사의 역할을 연계하여 분석한 최초의 연구이다. 실증분석 결과, 자기주식 취득 과정에서 사외이사의 역할이 통계적으로 유의하게 나타나고 있다. 구체적으로, 자기주식의 취득 목적을 주가안정으로 공시한 경우에는 사외이사가 이사회에서 차지하는 비율이 높고 사외이사의 참여율이 높을수록 주주의 부에 양(+)의 영향을 미치고 있었다. 그러나 취득 목적을 임직원들에 대한 인센티브 지급으로 공시한 경우에는 사외이사의 역할이 주주의 부에 유의한 영향을 미치지 않는 것으로 나타났다. 이러한 결과는 사외이사의 역할이 주주의 이해관계와 일치할 수 있는 경우, 즉, 주가안정 목적일 경우 사외이사에 대한 전문가가설이 타당하다는 것을 의미한다. 반면, 사외이사의 역할이 경영자의 이해와 일치할 수 있는 경우, 즉, 인센티브 지급목적일 경우, 사외이사에 대한 경영자우호가설이 지지되는 증거를 발견할 수 없었다.

Managerial opportunism hypothesis for the motivation of stock repurchases, draws attention recently in the empirical studies. To reduce these agency problems, outside director system has been employed in Korea. But, the role of outsider directors has not been clear. Thus, this study investigates the role of outside directors in the process of stock repurchases. This is the first empirical research that analyzes the role of outside directors in relation to firms' stock repurchases. The empirical results show that the outside directors affect the wealth of shareholder significantly. More importantly, when the interest of outside directors is the same as shareholders, that is, when the announced purpose is stock price stabilization, the roles of outside directors affect the wealth of stockholders positive. It implies that the expertise hypothesis is supported. On the other hand, when the interest of outside directors is the same as managers, that is, when the announced purpose is the payment of incentive stock options, the roles of outside directors are not significantly associated with the wealth of stockholders. It shows that the management friendliness hypothesis is not supported.

Managerial opportunism hypothesis for the motivation of stock repurchases, draws attention recently in the empirical studies. To reduce these agency problems, outside director system has been employed in Korea. But, the role of outsider directors has not been clear. Thus, this study investigates the role of outside directors in the process of stock repurchases. This is the first empirical research that analyzes the role of outside directors in relation to firms' stock repurchases. The empirical results show that the outside directors affect the wealth of shareholder significantly. More importantly, when the interest of outside directors is the same as shareholders, that is, when the announced purpose is stock price stabilization, the roles of outside directors affect the wealth of stockholders positive. It implies that the expertise hypothesis is supported. On the other hand, when the interest of outside directors is the same as managers, that is, when the announced purpose is the payment of incentive stock options, the roles of outside directors are not significantly associated with the wealth of stockholders. It shows that the management friendliness hypothesis is not supported.

Open Market Stock Repurchases, Managerial Opportunism Hypothesis, Outside Director, Expertise Hypothesis, Management Friendliness Hypothesis