초록 열기/닫기 버튼
This paper examines the characteristics of moral agent and practical functions in Cheong Yagyong's 丁若鏞 (1762-1836) theory of mind (xin 心). In Cheong’s thought, daeche 大體 (greater substance) or yeongche 靈體 (spiritual substance) are intangible and transcendent substances harbored in a material body but different from it. The substance of mind in itself has only an ontological meaning and does not hold any implications as a agent. It is through a moral function that the mind qualifies as a possible agent. Cheong's explication on the functions of the mind is confined to a practical dimension. Feeling (jeong 情), desire (yok 欲), and will (ji 志), which are all practical functions of the mind, are object-oriented, while intention (ui 意) is the deliberation of internal movements in the mind. Cheong interprets nature (xing 性) as a moral tendency or intentionality from which feeling, desire, and will are issued. In the place of intention, he employs a new concept: “gwonhyeong 權衡,” which means to weigh and choose between a moral inclination and a physical appetite. Gwonhyeong, whose function is secondary to the moral disposition for goodness (virtue), does not mean free will. Although Cheong's theory of mind is original, the absence of explanation for its cognitive function exposes a theoretical limitation.
論文中作者對丁若鏞心論中的道德主體和實踐作用進行了考察，並試圖說明其特性。大體和靈體做爲心的實體依賴著肉體而存在，但又不是與之混合存在的，而是以無形的超越的形式存在的。心的實體本身只帶有存在論的性質，不會表現主體的意義。心在道德的作用下才具有主體的意義，而丁若鏞在解釋心的作用時，則是將它限制在實踐的領域。感情、欲望和意志屬於實踐的作用，與之相反，意念則起到了揣摩和思考心內部活動的作用。作爲感情、欲望和意志根源的性可以解釋爲趨向性或傾向，衡量並對這兩種傾向進行選擇的權衡概念可以說就是意念。權衡只是追求善（德）的傾向中一個附帶的機能，不代表自由意志。雖然丁若鏞的心論有一定的獨創性，但是對於心認識性作用的說明有著理論的局限性。
