유럽헌법조약 제정 합의에 따라 EU의 기구 구조 및 제도에 대한 개혁이 가능할 수 있게 되었다. 특히 유럽법체계의 단순화, 각료이사회 의결제도로 이중다수결제도의 채택, 공동결정절차 적용 확대에 따른 유럽의회 권한 강화, 집행위원회 구성 논의, 유럽이사회 대통령직 및 외무장관직 신설 등의 제도개혁안은 EU 정책과정의 민주성, 투명성, 효율성을 개선하는데 크게 기여할 것으로 예상된다. 그러나 EU 제도개혁에는 한계요인 역시 존재하고 있다. 다양한 측면에서의 제도개혁에도 불구하고 회원국간 그리고 EU기구 사이의 갈등이 지속될 가능성이 여전히 남아있으며, 이는 궁극적으로 EU 정책과정의 민주성과 투명성을 약화시키는 중요한 원인이 될 수 있을 것이다. 결국 EU 제도개혁의 과제를 완수하기 위해서는 무엇보다 유럽통합 심화에 대한 회원국 정부의 정치적 의지가 우선 전제되어야 할 것이다.

The Constitutional Treaty for the European Union was finally agreed in Brussels on 18 June, 2004. While the constitution is a compromise between those who would like more integration and those who want to preserve the rights of the nation state, it certainly represents an important step forward compared to the previous Treaties. The constitution introduces a number of institutional reforms, such as simplification of the legislative procedure, introduction of 'double majority voting' in the Council's decision-making procedure, extended use of co-decision between the European Parliament and the Council under the ordinary legislative procedure, reform on the size and composition of the Commission, and the appointments of the new President of the European Council and the Minister for Foreign Affairs. These institutional changes are indeed significant achievements because these will impact greatly on both efficiency, transparency, and political credibility in the enlarged EU. Despite such achievements, the institutional reforms are also disappointing in certain aspects. In particular, executive accountability and legitimacy has not been adequately strengthened. At the same time, national governments are, to a certain extend, successful in optimizing their influence over important policy procedures. As a consequence, national interests are still able to hinder strategic policy-making at the EU level, in such policy areas as Common Foreign and Security Policy. This implies that further development of the EU depends not only on the institutional changes, but also on a genuine political committment and political will of the member states.

The Constitutional Treaty for the European Union was finally agreed in Brussels on 18 June, 2004. While the constitution is a compromise between those who would like more integration and those who want to preserve the rights of the nation state, it certainly represents an important step forward compared to the previous Treaties. The constitution introduces a number of institutional reforms, such as simplification of the legislative procedure, introduction of 'double majority voting' in the Council's decision-making procedure, extended use of co-decision between the European Parliament and the Council under the ordinary legislative procedure, reform on the size and composition of the Commission, and the appointments of the new President of the European Council and the Minister for Foreign Affairs. These institutional changes are indeed significant achievements because these will impact greatly on both efficiency, transparency, and political credibility in the enlarged EU. Despite such achievements, the institutional reforms are also disappointing in certain aspects. In particular, executive accountability and legitimacy has not been adequately strengthened. At the same time, national governments are, to a certain extend, successful in optimizing their influence over important policy procedures. As a consequence, national interests are still able to hinder strategic policy-making at the EU level, in such policy areas as Common Foreign and Security Policy. This implies that further development of the EU depends not only on the institutional changes, but also on a genuine political committment and political will of the member states.

Constitutional Treaty for Europe, European Union, EU Institutional Reform, Convention on the Future of Europe