서구 근대의 ‘權, 權利’나 ‘자연권’이란 관념 내지 개념은 동아시아3국(청국, 일본, 조선)에서는 유교 특히 주자학 사상을 매개로 수용되었다. 예컨대 ‘천부인권=자연권, 자연법(=性法)’ 관념은 주자학의 ‘天理自然, 性即理’라는 명제 없인 수용될 수 없었다. 여기서 매개란 <전통>과 <근대> 의 이종교배를 함축한 개념이다. 그런데 3국의 주자학 전통은 서로 같음과 다름을 지니고 있다. 따라서 3국에서의 권리 관념의 수용과 변용, 그리고 이종교배의 양상에도 같음과 다름이 발생하게 된다. 그렇다면 권리 관념이 유교나 주자학 사상을 매개로 수용되었음은 무엇을 뜻할까? 이는 유교나 주자학 사상 안에 고유한 권리 관념이 담겨 있었음을 뜻한다. 본고는 유길준(1856-1914)과 후쿠자와 유키치(1835-1901)의 사상에 보이는 ‘권리’ 관념의 수용과 변용의 양상을 비교고찰한다. 이들은 권리나 자연권 관념을 어떻게 수용했을까? 그리고 이들의 권리 관념은 어떻게 변용해 갔을까? 그 과정에서 권리와 권력, 그리고 자연권과 법부권의 관계를 어떻게 이해하고 있었을까? 단 이에 앞서 다음절에선 ‘rights’의 번역어 ‘權, 權利’를 둘러싼 번역의 문제에 언급해 둔다. 마지막으로 이들 두 사람의 법․규범 사고에 드러난 차이와 이에 관련한 필자의 견해를 피력하고자 한다.

The modern Western concept of right(s) or the idea of natural rights was introduced to the East Asian countries China, Japan, and Korea, through the mediation of Confucian thought, especially with the help of neo-Confucian concepts. For example, ziranquan(自然權; natural rights), tianfurenquan(天賦人權; rights endowed by Heaven) or xingfa(性法)/ziranfa(自然法; natural law) could not be introduced without the neo-Confucian concepts of the ‘Heavenly Principle of Nature, tianliziran(天理自然)’ or the idea of ‘Nature as Principle/Reason, xingzeli(性卽理).’ Here mediation means a way of reception which entails hybridization between ‘traditions’ and ‘the modern.’ By the way, the neo-Confucian traditions in the East Asian countries showes similarities and differences. Therefore it appeared similarities and differences in the modes of reception, change, and hybridization of the right(s) idea among East Asian countries. Then what does it mean that the idea of right(s) was introduced through the mediation of (neo-) Confucian thought? It means that there have been indeginous ideas of right(s) in (neo-) Confucianism. In this paper, I will examine and compare the mode of reception and the change of the concept of right(s) in the thought of Yu Kilchun (1856-1914) and Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835-1901). How did both receive the concept of the natural rights and law? How did the notion of right(s) change in both? In this process of change, how did both tackle the question how to coordinate the relationship between rights and power; between natural rights and law-bound rights (i.e., people’s rights enacted bt law)? Before answering these questions, in the next section, I would like to discuss the problems of translation concerned with renderings of right(s). Lastly, I will analyze the differences in legal thinking of Yu and Fukuzawa, and put my view on it.

The modern Western concept of right(s) or the idea of natural rights was introduced to the East Asian countries China, Japan, and Korea, through the mediation of Confucian thought, especially with the help of neo-Confucian concepts. For example, ziranquan(自然權; natural rights), tianfurenquan(天賦人權; rights endowed by Heaven) or xingfa(性法)/ziranfa(自然法; natural law) could not be introduced without the neo-Confucian concepts of the ‘Heavenly Principle of Nature, tianliziran(天理自然)’ or the idea of ‘Nature as Principle/Reason, xingzeli(性卽理).’ Here mediation means a way of reception which entails hybridization between ‘traditions’ and ‘the modern.’ By the way, the neo-Confucian traditions in the East Asian countries showes similarities and differences. Therefore it appeared similarities and differences in the modes of reception, change, and hybridization of the right(s) idea among East Asian countries. Then what does it mean that the idea of right(s) was introduced through the mediation of (neo-) Confucian thought? It means that there have been indeginous ideas of right(s) in (neo-) Confucianism. In this paper, I will examine and compare the mode of reception and the change of the concept of right(s) in the thought of Yu Kilchun (1856-1914) and Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835-1901). How did both receive the concept of the natural rights and law? How did the notion of right(s) change in both? In this process of change, how did both tackle the question how to coordinate the relationship between rights and power; between natural rights and law-bound rights (i.e., people’s rights enacted bt law)? Before answering these questions, in the next section, I would like to discuss the problems of translation concerned with renderings of right(s). Lastly, I will analyze the differences in legal thinking of Yu and Fukuzawa, and put my view on it.

right(s), natural rights/law, natural rights of tianli,hybridization, power, property