지각, 예컨대 시각의 주체는 눈(眼根)인가 의식(眼識)인가 하는 根見/識見의 문제는 불교학의 고전적인 문제 중의 하나였다. 이는 존재와 지식에 관한 불교 諸派의 입장을 드러내는 바로미터로, 설일체유부가 根見說의 입장이었다면 法救나 하리발마(『成實論』), 상좌부(『카타밧투』) 등은 識見說을 주장하였다. 이에 대해 譬喩者는 和合見說을 주장하였다. 『五事毘婆沙論』이나 『雜阿毘曇心論』에 의하면 여기서의 ‘화합’은 심․심소의 화합이지만, 이것이 구체적으로 어떤 내용의 학설인지는 분명치 않다. 그런데 『구사론』에는 “眼과 色에 의지하여 眼識이 생겨난다”는 경설에 따라 根見과 識見을 모두 파기하는 경량부 학설이 인용된다. 이들에 따르면 眼根과 眼識은 오로지 찰나멸하는 인과적 관계로서만 존재하여 작용을 갖지 않기 때문에 시각주체에 관한 논의는 무의미하며, “눈이 色을 본다”는 등의 말은 다만 세간의 언어적 표현일 뿐이다. 譬喩者의 和合見說과 經量部의 根․識 無作用說은 고래로 동일 학파의 동일 학설로 이해되어 왔다. 그러나 최근 양 설은 별개의 학설이라는 가설이 제기되었다. 아마도 양 설의 불분명함이 가설의 단초가 되었을 것이다. 가설의 주된 논거는 경량부의 학설이 유가행파의 문헌에서 트레이스된다는 것이었지만, 거기서의 논거 역시 그다지 분명하지 않다. 결론적으로 양 설은 上座 슈리라타 계통의 譬喩者(=경량부)의 인식론(즉 有形相知識論)으로, 根․境․識(心)과 諸心所의 次第生起說에 따른 논리적 귀결이다. 즉 이들은 刹那滅에 따른 根․境(제1찰나)-識(제2찰나)의 계시적 인과관계를 ‘和合’으로 규정하고, “눈이 색을 본다”는 등의 언어적 표현에서의 주체와 작용/ 주체와 대상을 원인과 결과에 근거한 가설로 이해하였다. 이러한 사실은 『유가사지론』의 「勝義伽他」에서도 확인된다. 시각주체에 관한 유가행파의 勝義道理는 譬喩者의 和合見說에 기초한 것이라 말할 수 있다.

The problem of ‘sense organ sees’ and ‘consciousness sees’ which means the agent of perception such as seeing(dṛṣtṛ) is whether the eye or the conscious, was one of the classical problems in Buddhology. This was a barometer of showing Buddhist schools' position of existence and knowledge, and if Sarvāstvādin took sense organ sees's position, Dharmatrāta, Harivarman(*Tattvasiddhi-śāstra) and Theravādin(Kathavattu) claimed the theory of ‘consciousness sees’. On the contrary Dārṣṭāntika claimed theory of ‘the aggregation(sāmagrī) sees’. According to *Pañcavastukavibhāṣa-śāstra etc., the component of ‘aggregation’ is a mind(citta) and mind-concomitants(caitta), but it's not sure what the theory is about. However in Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, theory of Sautrāntika which criticizes both ‘sense organ sees’ and ‘consciousness sees’ following the sūtra's words that “The eye-consciousness arises by relying on eyes and color(rūpa)” is being quoted. They said that because of sense organ and consciousness don't have any action(nirvyāparā), the discussion of agent of seeing is meaningless, and the words such as "the eye sees color" etc. are just worldy expressions. But this also doesn't have clear meanings. Nevertheless traditionally Dārṣṭāntika's theory of ‘the aggregation sees’ and Sautrāntika's theory of 'the non-action of sense organs and consciousness' was understood as same school's same opinion. However, because of Sautrāntika's theory has been traced in Yogācāra's reference, the hypothesis that two theories are different ones came up recently. To conclude, two theories are epistemology(sākārajñānavāda) of Sthavira Śrīlāta's Dārṣṭāntika(namely Sautrāntika), and it's logical conclusion followed by successive arise of sense organ/object/consciousness(mind) and mind-concomitants. That is they define aggregation(sāmagrī or saṃnipāta) as causal relationship of sense organ/object(first moment) and consciousness(second moment), and understood the agent and action in a statement such as "the eye sees color" as linguistic expression(upacāra) base on the cause and effect. This argument is also confirmed in Yogācārabhūmi's Paramārthagāthā. Yogācāra's ultimate position about the agent of perception also can be said that it was base on the Dārṣṭāntika's theory of 'the aggregation sees'.

The problem of ‘sense organ sees’ and ‘consciousness sees’ which means the agent of perception such as seeing(dṛṣtṛ) is whether the eye or the conscious, was one of the classical problems in Buddhology. This was a barometer of showing Buddhist schools' position of existence and knowledge, and if Sarvāstvādin took sense organ sees's position, Dharmatrāta, Harivarman(*Tattvasiddhi-śāstra) and Theravādin(Kathavattu) claimed the theory of ‘consciousness sees’. On the contrary Dārṣṭāntika claimed theory of ‘the aggregation(sāmagrī) sees’. According to *Pañcavastukavibhāṣa-śāstra etc., the component of ‘aggregation’ is a mind(citta) and mind-concomitants(caitta), but it's not sure what the theory is about. However in Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, theory of Sautrāntika which criticizes both ‘sense organ sees’ and ‘consciousness sees’ following the sūtra's words that “The eye-consciousness arises by relying on eyes and color(rūpa)” is being quoted. They said that because of sense organ and consciousness don't have any action(nirvyāparā), the discussion of agent of seeing is meaningless, and the words such as "the eye sees color" etc. are just worldy expressions. But this also doesn't have clear meanings. Nevertheless traditionally Dārṣṭāntika's theory of ‘the aggregation sees’ and Sautrāntika's theory of 'the non-action of sense organs and consciousness' was understood as same school's same opinion. However, because of Sautrāntika's theory has been traced in Yogācāra's reference, the hypothesis that two theories are different ones came up recently. To conclude, two theories are epistemology(sākārajñānavāda) of Sthavira Śrīlāta's Dārṣṭāntika(namely Sautrāntika), and it's logical conclusion followed by successive arise of sense organ/object/consciousness(mind) and mind-concomitants. That is they define aggregation(sāmagrī or saṃnipāta) as causal relationship of sense organ/object(first moment) and consciousness(second moment), and understood the agent and action in a statement such as "the eye sees color" as linguistic expression(upacāra) base on the cause and effect. This argument is also confirmed in Yogācārabhūmi's Paramārthagāthā. Yogācāra's ultimate position about the agent of perception also can be said that it was base on the Dārṣṭāntika's theory of 'the aggregation sees'.

Dārṣṭāntika, Sautrāntika, Sthavira Śrīlāta, theory of ‘the aggregation(sāmagrī) sees’, theory of ‘the non-action(nirvyāpāra) of sense organs and consciousness’.