Since the Criminal Procedure Code was enacted in 1954, prosecutors have enjoyed their superior position to police officers because the former is given legal authority to direct and supervise crime investigations carried by the latter. The Legislature intended to give prosecutors control over police officers most of whom served for the Japanese colonial rule, hardly with the respect toward human rights. The police under the authoritarian regime were criticized for illegal misconduct and corruption, and they had obviously weak ground to argue for their independency in crime investigations of prosecutors' control. As a result, the prosecutors' supremacy over police officers has been maintained after democratization as well. Recently, however, prosecutors have become a major target of criticism that they have abused their authority and discretion both in investigation and in prosecution especially in high-profiled political corruption cases, as has incurred public distrust in them. On the other hand, the police since democratization have attempted to get autonomy in investigating crimes, arguing they have achieved the reform of their investigatory system. This article first briefly reviews the recent discussion between the Prosecutor's Office and the National Police Agency. It then examines the principles reallocating the investigatory power between the two law enforcement authorities. It maintains the reallocation should be done following the principle of check-and-balance and considering the effect of the newly-established jury trial on the prosecution without fundamental reconstruction of the current investigation system such as the revision of the Constitution. Third, it argues the general legal ground for the crime investigation by the police should be explicitly articulated in the Criminal Procedure Code; the prosecutors' control over police officers needs to be maintained to guarantee the legal correctness of police investigation and deter police misconduct in investigation, while prosecutors' intervention into police investigation in the beginning stage of crime investigation needs to be limited to a certain category of serious felonies; as to other lighter crimes, the police should have autonomy to investigate them with reservation for prosecutors' check-up in the final stage. Finally, the present article submits a draft of the Criminal Procedure Code to reallocate the investigatory power between prosecutors and police officers.

Since the Criminal Procedure Code was enacted in 1954, prosecutors have enjoyed their superior position to police officers because the former is given legal authority to direct and supervise crime investigations carried by the latter. The Legislature intended to give prosecutors control over police officers most of whom served for the Japanese colonial rule, hardly with the respect toward human rights. The police under the authoritarian regime were criticized for illegal misconduct and corruption, and they had obviously weak ground to argue for their independency in crime investigations of prosecutors' control. As a result, the prosecutors' supremacy over police officers has been maintained after democratization as well. Recently, however, prosecutors have become a major target of criticism that they have abused their authority and discretion both in investigation and in prosecution especially in high-profiled political corruption cases, as has incurred public distrust in them. On the other hand, the police since democratization have attempted to get autonomy in investigating crimes, arguing they have achieved the reform of their investigatory system. This article first briefly reviews the recent discussion between the Prosecutor's Office and the National Police Agency. It then examines the principles reallocating the investigatory power between the two law enforcement authorities. It maintains the reallocation should be done following the principle of check-and-balance and considering the effect of the newly-established jury trial on the prosecution without fundamental reconstruction of the current investigation system such as the revision of the Constitution. Third, it argues the general legal ground for the crime investigation by the police should be explicitly articulated in the Criminal Procedure Code; the prosecutors' control over police officers needs to be maintained to guarantee the legal correctness of police investigation and deter police misconduct in investigation, while prosecutors' intervention into police investigation in the beginning stage of crime investigation needs to be limited to a certain category of serious felonies; as to other lighter crimes, the police should have autonomy to investigate them with reservation for prosecutors' check-up in the final stage. Finally, the present article submits a draft of the Criminal Procedure Code to reallocate the investigatory power between prosecutors and police officers.

investigatory power, autonomy of police investigation, crime investigation