이승만 대통령이 선포한 평화선(Peace Line, Rhee Line)은 해수(海水, watercolumn)의 상하와 해붕(海棚, 大陸棚)의 상하를 포함하는 인접해양에 대한 주권적 권리를 포괄적으로 선언한 것으로서 오늘날의 배타적 경제수역과 그 개념이 거의 같다. 1965년 박정희 정권은 한일어업협정을 체결하여 일본 어민에 대하여 평화선을 사실상 폐기하였다. 그러나 김대중 정권은 1999년 신한일어업협정을 체결하여 독도를 아무런 표시도 없이 중간수역에 넣고 그 안에서 기국주의에 기하여 한일어업공동위원회가 권고하는 사항을 양국이 국내법을 만들어 각 어민에 실시하도록 함으로써 공동관리적 요소를 가미하였다. 이것은 중·일간 분쟁도서인 센카쿠(尖角) 열도 내지 디아위(釣魚)도 주변수역에 대하여 일본이 중국이나 대만과 잠정수역이나 중간수역과 같은 공동관리적 수역을 만들지 않고 온전하게 주권적 권리를 행사해온 것과 크게 대조되어, 미국 지명위원회(BGN)는 2008. 7 한 때 독도에 대하여 한국 정부의 주권적 권리 행사에 정합성이 부족하다면서 ‘주권미지정지역’으로 결정했던 일이 있다. 노무현 정권은 2005년 일본 시마네 현이 ‘다케시마의 날’을 제정하고 2006년에는 독도 근해에서 해저 측량을 시도하는 등 공세적인 입장으로 나오자, 김대중 정권 이래 독도 암석론에 기하여 독도기점을 무시하고 대일본 유화정책을 펴온 정책을 접고, 독도 유인도론에 의해 경계획정 시 독도가 기점으로 사용되어야 한다는 입장으로 변경했다. 이러한 일본의 공세정책은 독도가 무인도로서 영해만을 갖고 그 주변수역은 독도와 무관하다는 김대중 정부의 이론에 결함이 있다고 보고, 한국 정부가 독도 주변수역의 해저에 대한 권리를 효과적으로 주장하기 위해서는 독도가 유인도로서 배타적경제수역을 가질 수 있는 섬이어야 하기 때문이었다. 이는 곧 경계획정문제로 귀착하는 것이므로, 한국 정부는 독도와 일본의 옹키(隱岐)섬간의 중간선까지 주권을 행사할 수 있다는 것과, 공평한 해결을 위하여 일본과 협상을 할 수 있다는 것을 천명하였다. 그러나, 공평한 경계획정을 위해서는 망망대해 에 위치한 조그만 섬인 독도를 무시하거나 그 가치를 현저히 축소하여 해양경계선을 도출하는 것이 바람직할 것이다.

The 1952 Korean Proclamation of the Rhee Line surrounding the Korean peninsula with several straight lines was similar to the regime of the EEZ, as it comprised the water-column and the seabed of the adjacent seas up to the possible maximum outer-limits. It was soon vehemently criticized by Japan, as it would drive out incoming Japanese fishermen from the declared seas. Japan also claimed the ownership of the islet of Dokdo or Takeshima, which was included in the Rhee Line, asserting that it used to be a Japanese territory before the 1910 annexation. Protracted negotiations over a decade produced the 1965 Japan/ Korea Fisheries Agreement, wherein Korea allowed the Japanese fishermen to fish in the entire Korean waters beyond 12 mile exclusive zone. As a result, the Rhee Line was no longer to be applicable to the Japanese fishermen. Dokdo was left without any 12 mile exclusive zone in the hazy zone of joint fisheries resources survey outside of the zone of joint fisheries resources preservation. In the 1999 Japan/Korea Fisheries Agreement, Dokdo was to be located in the nameless zone of joint management of fisheries, influenced by the “provisional arrangement of a practical nature” as provided in Articles 74 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. There was a vehement criticism over such an arrangement in Korea, because the rocky islet of Dokdo has not been regarded as a disputed one by Korea due to the solid evidential facts and the sound legal bases. South Korea had to accept such an arrangement ‘unwillingly’ while she was under IMF management when it needed Japan’s help during the financial crisis. It had to persuade the angry Koreans saying that the nameless interme-diate zone has no character of joint management, since the rocky islet can generate only a 12 mile territorial sea without existence of any possibly sustainable human habitation or economic life of its own. However, in May 2006 when Japan attempted to conduct a scientific survey over the seabed around the disputed islet, Korea had to abandon the theory, newly asserting that it can generate 200 mile EEZ for it can sustain human habitation and economic life of its own, emphasizing upon the 'possible capacity standard’ provided in Article 121 (3) of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Due to the change, Korea came to face a difficulty in denying any existence of a character of a joint management in the nameless zone, which would no longer be regarded as a zone with a character of the high seas, since it is consequently a potential EEZ generated from the disputed islet. In July 2008, the US Board of Geographical Names labelled the islet as ‘sovereignty undesignated’ due to an appraisal that Korea is in lack of integrity in exercising its sovereign rights generating from the islet. The BGN had to restore the label of the Korean sovereignty as advised by President Bush who would otherwise face vehement protest during his coming visit to Seoul in early August. It is interesting to note that the BGN has maintained the Japanese sovereignty over the disputed Senkaku islets due to the fact that Japan has exercised its full sovereign rights without making any provisional arrangement in the marginal seas off the islets with China or Taiwan. South Korea should learn such a wisdom from Japan in exercising full sovereign rights over Dokdo if it would persuade a third party like the BGN that it is exercising its sovereign rights over Dokdo and its marginal seas.

The 1952 Korean Proclamation of the Rhee Line surrounding the Korean peninsula with several straight lines was similar to the regime of the EEZ, as it comprised the water-column and the seabed of the adjacent seas up to the possible maximum outer-limits. It was soon vehemently criticized by Japan, as it would drive out incoming Japanese fishermen from the declared seas. Japan also claimed the ownership of the islet of Dokdo or Takeshima, which was included in the Rhee Line, asserting that it used to be a Japanese territory before the 1910 annexation. Protracted negotiations over a decade produced the 1965 Japan/ Korea Fisheries Agreement, wherein Korea allowed the Japanese fishermen to fish in the entire Korean waters beyond 12 mile exclusive zone. As a result, the Rhee Line was no longer to be applicable to the Japanese fishermen. Dokdo was left without any 12 mile exclusive zone in the hazy zone of joint fisheries resources survey outside of the zone of joint fisheries resources preservation. In the 1999 Japan/Korea Fisheries Agreement, Dokdo was to be located in the nameless zone of joint management of fisheries, influenced by the “provisional arrangement of a practical nature” as provided in Articles 74 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. There was a vehement criticism over such an arrangement in Korea, because the rocky islet of Dokdo has not been regarded as a disputed one by Korea due to the solid evidential facts and the sound legal bases. South Korea had to accept such an arrangement ‘unwillingly’ while she was under IMF management when it needed Japan’s help during the financial crisis. It had to persuade the angry Koreans saying that the nameless interme-diate zone has no character of joint management, since the rocky islet can generate only a 12 mile territorial sea without existence of any possibly sustainable human habitation or economic life of its own. However, in May 2006 when Japan attempted to conduct a scientific survey over the seabed around the disputed islet, Korea had to abandon the theory, newly asserting that it can generate 200 mile EEZ for it can sustain human habitation and economic life of its own, emphasizing upon the 'possible capacity standard’ provided in Article 121 (3) of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Due to the change, Korea came to face a difficulty in denying any existence of a character of a joint management in the nameless zone, which would no longer be regarded as a zone with a character of the high seas, since it is consequently a potential EEZ generated from the disputed islet. In July 2008, the US Board of Geographical Names labelled the islet as ‘sovereignty undesignated’ due to an appraisal that Korea is in lack of integrity in exercising its sovereign rights generating from the islet. The BGN had to restore the label of the Korean sovereignty as advised by President Bush who would otherwise face vehement protest during his coming visit to Seoul in early August. It is interesting to note that the BGN has maintained the Japanese sovereignty over the disputed Senkaku islets due to the fact that Japan has exercised its full sovereign rights without making any provisional arrangement in the marginal seas off the islets with China or Taiwan. South Korea should learn such a wisdom from Japan in exercising full sovereign rights over Dokdo if it would persuade a third party like the BGN that it is exercising its sovereign rights over Dokdo and its marginal seas.

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Rhee Line, Dokdo, Senkaku, Japan/Korea Fisheries Agreement, provisional arrangement, sovereign rights, Board of Geographical Names