초록 열기/닫기 버튼

이 논문의 목적은 미 부시행정부의 대북한 정책과 그 변화를 외교정책이념 접근법과 정부정치모델을 적용하여 설명하는 것이다. 분석의 결과로서 첫째, 대북정책을 둘러싸고 부통령실과 국방성 중심의 강경파와 국무성 중심의 협상파가 갈등하였는데, 각 정책연합이 선호하는 정책입장은 각자가 공유하는 외교정책이념에 의해 주로 결정되었다. 즉 강경파가 선호한 압박정책은 신보수주의 이념의 정책처방을 주로 반영한 것이었다. 반면에 협상파는 현실주의의 정책처방을 반영한 관여정책을 선호하였다. 둘째, 2006년 10월까지 지속된 대북 압박정책은 정부정치모델이 가정하고 있듯이 강경파와 협상파간 경쟁과 갈등의 결과로서 정책결정에서 주도권을 잡은 강경파가 선호하는 정책입장을 반영한 것이었다. 셋째, '2.13 북핵 합의'에서 구체화된 관여정책으로의 변화는 정책결정의 주도권이 국무성 협상파로 넘어간 결과였다. 변화된 관여정책은 협상파가 공유하는 현실주의 이념에 의해 주로 결정되었다.


The purpose of this study is to explain the Bush Administration's policy toward North Korea and its change from theoretical perspectives of the schools-of-thought of foreign policy and the governmental politics model. As the result of the analysis provided by this study, first, there were divisions and conflict over North Korea policy between hard-liners in the vice-president's office and the Defense Department, on one hand, and moderates mainly in the State Department, on the other hand. And their policy positions were largely determined by schools of thought of foreign policy shared by decision makers of each coalition. Whereas a policy of pressure favored by the hard-liners reflected prescriptions offered by neo-conservatism, a policy of engagement preferred by the moderates was guided by realism. Second, the policy of pressure, which continued until October 2006, was the political resultant of competition and conflict between the hard-liners and the moderates, and reflected the policy position favored by the former who had the initiative and control over the policy-making process. Third, a change of policy to one of engagement, which was actualized in the Feb. 13 Agreement on the North Korean nuclear problem, resulted mainly from the factor that the initiative and control over the policy-making process were shifted to the hands of the State Department moderates. The changed policy of engagement was primarily determined by the realist school of thought shared among them.