본 글은 1990년대 이후 현대기업제도를 실시하면서, 중국 공산당이 어떻게 기업내부에서 당의 영향력을 발휘하는가를 집중적으로 연구하고 있다. 특히 국유기업 내부 당위원회가 인사과정에서 어떻게 영향력을 미치고 있는지를 중점적으로 살피고 있다. 시장화와 효율 극대화를 추구하면서도 동시에 기업 내 당의 영향력을 여전히 유지하려는 중국 공산당의 고심의 산물인 새로운 기업 거버넌스(new corporate governance),즉 ‘쌍방향진입 교차임직제’를 집중적으로 논구했다. 본 글이 집중적으로 논증한 부분은 첫째로, 시장화 과정 속에서 당위원회(당조직)의 영향력은 간접적이고 제도화된 틀 내에서 여전히 유지되고 있다는 점이다. 즉 당이 과거의 직접적이고 강력한 통제력 행사에서 벗어나 보다 유연하게 법적 제도적 틀 내에서 기업 거버넌스를 실시하고 있다는 점이다. 둘째로는 정부 당국이 공공연하게 외치고 있는 정부와 기업의 분리(政企分離), 당과 기업의 분리(黨企分離)정책이 실제로는 제대로 이뤄지지 않고 있다는 점이다. 셋째, 최근 현대기업제도를 선진적으로 추진하고 있는 상해(上海)모델 역시 인사관리 맥락에서 보면, 대형국유기업(그룹, 모기업)의 최상층부 인사 부문에서 여전히 ‘정기분리’와 ‘당기분리’가 완전하게 이뤄지지 않고 있다는 점이다. 요컨대 이 글은 현대기업제도 환경 하에서 중국 공산당이 인사관리를 통해 어떻게 새롭게 기업 내 영향력을 유지하고 있는가를 논구한 것이다.

This article deals with how the Chinese Communist Party (hereafter CCP) exercises its influence on modern State-Owned Enterprise (hereafter SOEs) after 1990s. In particular, this study focuses on how the Party Committee in SOEs has influence on personnel management. Furthermore, the present study explores ‘new corporate governance’ which CCP, while pursuing marketization and maximization of efficiency, has created in order to maintain its influence within SOEs. Especially, the present study investigates 'Reciprocal Participation & Cross-Appointment System' which the Chinese government put forward as new corporate governance system. This study attempts to argue the following points: First, the Party Committee in SOEs has had indirect influence over SOEs by intervening personnel management only. Second, the policy of separation between government and enterprise and between party and enterprise, which has been propagandized in public by the CCP, has not been exercised in reality. It was also true of the case of Shanghai's model of modern enterprise system which the Shanghai Municipal Government has pushed forward. No significant separation was found. To sum up, the CCP and the Chinese government have exercised their considerable influence over modern SOEs through their personnel management.

This article deals with how the Chinese Communist Party (hereafter CCP) exercises its influence on modern State-Owned Enterprise (hereafter SOEs) after 1990s. In particular, this study focuses on how the Party Committee in SOEs has influence on personnel management. Furthermore, the present study explores ‘new corporate governance’ which CCP, while pursuing marketization and maximization of efficiency, has created in order to maintain its influence within SOEs. Especially, the present study investigates 'Reciprocal Participation & Cross-Appointment System' which the Chinese government put forward as new corporate governance system. This study attempts to argue the following points: First, the Party Committee in SOEs has had indirect influence over SOEs by intervening personnel management only. Second, the policy of separation between government and enterprise and between party and enterprise, which has been propagandized in public by the CCP, has not been exercised in reality. It was also true of the case of Shanghai's model of modern enterprise system which the Shanghai Municipal Government has pushed forward. No significant separation was found. To sum up, the CCP and the Chinese government have exercised their considerable influence over modern SOEs through their personnel management.

New Corporate Governance, 'Reciprocal Participation & Cross-Appointment System', Personnel Management