중국은 체제전환과정에서 국유기업을 통해서 사회안정(고용유지)과 경제적 효율성을 동시에 추구하는 방향에서 개혁을 시도하였다. 본 논문은 국유기업개혁과정에서 사회안정을 목표로 하는 정치가와 경제적 효율성을 목표로 하는 경영자가 각자 목표를 추구할 때 기업 경영권 배분문제와 관련하여 부패가 발생할 수 있다는 것을 경제모형을 통해서 제시하고 있다. 두 목표가 상쇄관계(trade-off)에 있기 때문에 국유기업은 이것을 동시에 달성할 수 없다. 이것의 해결방법은 국유기업도 비국유기업처럼 경제적 효율성에 전념하도록 해야 한다. 이렇게 하기 위해 국유기업이 담당한 사회안정 역할을 분리하고 기업의 재산권을 경영자에게 명확하게 이전해야한다. 그리고 정부는 완전한 시장제도 창출자로서, 기업경영에 대한 외부감시자로 역할을 수행해야 한다.

Since Reform & Open Policy in 1978, China has attempted to reform state-owned enterprises(SOEs) by pursuing the social stability and economic efficiency at the same time. Based upon these two roles of SOEs, I has built up economic model, which ensures the corruption will result from the difference of the objective pursued by the politician for social stability or the manager for economic efficiency. With trade-off relation between social stability and economic efficiency, these two objectives can't be achieved at the same time. So social stability should be made separate from SOEs' which is encouraged to improve the economic efficiency. And the property rights related to SOEs should be transferred to the manager of SOEs. Instead government should play a role as the producer of market-oriented institutions and outside inspector.

Since Reform & Open Policy in 1978, China has attempted to reform state-owned enterprises(SOEs) by pursuing the social stability and economic efficiency at the same time. Based upon these two roles of SOEs, I has built up economic model, which ensures the corruption will result from the difference of the objective pursued by the politician for social stability or the manager for economic efficiency. With trade-off relation between social stability and economic efficiency, these two objectives can't be achieved at the same time. So social stability should be made separate from SOEs' which is encouraged to improve the economic efficiency. And the property rights related to SOEs should be transferred to the manager of SOEs. Instead government should play a role as the producer of market-oriented institutions and outside inspector.

state-owned enterprise, social stability, economic efficiency, corruption problem, property right of firm.